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CHARITABLE ACCOUNTABILITY AND REFORM IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND: THE CASE OF THE CHARITY COMMISSION
JAMES J. FISHMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Fraudulent behavior by charitable fiduciaries brings universal con-
demnation. Such wrongs never have been countenanced, though seemingly,
they have always occurred. 1 However, disapprobation by itself never has
translated into an efficient system for the accountability of charitable as-
sets. This Article examines the nineteenth-century struggle to form a char-
ity commission to oversee English charitable endowments. Administrative
reform can have an interminable germination as the creation of the Charity
Commission demonstrates. A conundrum is that even though the need for
reform of charitable administration was long recognized and a consensus
reached on the structure of the overseeing body (though not its scope), the
resulting agency came under almost immediate criticism and was disliked,
disrespected, deprived of resources, and ultimately ineffective.
Why is it so difficult to carry out effective institutional change? Why
did the principle of charitable accountability, a nearly unanimously sup-
ported ideal, ring so hollow in practice? This Article offers hypotheses
about the difficulties of administrative reform, through the prism of the
nineteenth century, which may apply to contemporary issues of charitable
accountability.
Charitable accountability is the process of ascertaining that assets de-
voted to charitable pursuits are put to their proper purpose and that infor-
mation about their use is made available to the public or to governmental
authorities. Modem approaches to charitable accountability, ranging from
annual filing of a financial statement to periodic review of activities by a
government official, can be traced to local efforts that commenced in eight-
eenth-century Great Britain. Earlier attempts to hold charitable fiduciaries
to their trust included the visitation right by a settlor or founder of a charity,
* © 2005 James J. Fishman.
1. As early as the fifteenth century, bills of complaint came to the chancellor about the misuse of
charitable legacies. See GARETH JONES, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARITY 1532-1827, at 7-9 (1969).
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and a petition to the Chancellor by the Attorney General (or another gov-
ermnental agency) or by individuals associated with the charity. The state's
primary role in assuring charitable accountability was in defining which
activities could be designated as "charitable" so as to allocate those re-
sources to the government's vision of their highest use.
I. CHARITABLE REGULATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE
BROUGHAM COMMISSION
Nineteenth-century England, often called an age of reform, was a pe-
riod of enormous political, social, and economic change. In the first two
decades came an increase in the rate of transformation of the economy, the
polity, and society, and a greater stir and movement in all spheres of public
activity caused by more "rational and purposive control based upon meas-
uring, counting, and observing."'2 Political, economic, and governmental
institutions developed modem structures and approaches.
Charitable regulation reflected these trends. As part of a broader
movement of inquiry, supervision, and statutory reform, and in an effort to
remedy the social evils of the time, the administration and abuse of charita-
ble trusts became a part of a larger agenda of reform, leading to the creation
at midcentury of a national charity commission that oversaw philanthropic
organizations. The rationale for charitable reform was a govemmental hope
to capture a supposedly huge corpus of charitable assets, a proportion of
which were misspent, unspent, or devoted to obsolete purposes, and to
utilize them for modem needs such as education. Charities were examined
with a new thoroughness and scope in contrast to the past. The catalyst and
justification for change was the opportunistic fiduciary, misappropriating or
misspending trust assets. Publicity surrounding charitable scandals pro-
vided the impetus for parliamentary reform. Chancery's inefficient hold of
oversight of charities was loosened. By century's end a modem structure of
charitable accountability was in place, a permanent charity commission,
though of questionable vigor and modest effectiveness.
On the national level, there had been increasing governmental inquir-
ies of social and economic problems using empirical techniques since the
accession of George III in 1760. The pursuit of rational ends by rational
means was furthered through the device of Royal Commissions of Inquiry.
Social inquiries that measured the contours of society, assessed its wealth,
probed some of the nastier problems, and suggested policy directions were
2. SIR EARNEST LLEWELLYN WOODWARD, THE AGE OF REFORM 1815-1870, at 39 (2d ed.
1962).
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used as a basis for legislation.3 Not until the last quarter of the century was
there any national interest in the administration of charities in England. In
the 1780s, Parliament, at the urging of a member Thomas Gilbert, in the
context of his interest in the examination of poor law expenditures and the
use of charitable endowments for relief of the poor, passed a statute 4 that
required ministers and churchworkers to provide data on charities that
benefited the poor.5 The response from English parishes was nearly com-
prehensive. Of thirteen thousand parishes, only fourteen failed to file, but
the information was far from complete. 6 The significance of the Irish ex-
perience and the "Gilbert Returns," as they became known, was that they
marked the national government's initial step toward oversight of the chari-
table sector and reflected a need for better monitoring. The first stirrings for
English charitable trust reform, based on a model used in Ireland, were
introduced unsuccessfully in 1809 by William Wilberforce, the great anti-
slavery advocate and others, but were rejected by the House of Commons.
Subsequent efforts from 1809 to 1811 failed as well.7 In 1812, a registry
provision was adopted, but it was unsuccessful. 8 There were but four hun-
3. Though governmental inquiries can be traced to the Domesday book of 1086 and clerical
visitations dated to the middle ages, in the eighteenth century, government's focus on social problems
led to a new kind of social inquiry based on empirical methods. This "political arithmetic," as it came to
be called, was commenced by private philanthropists and empiricists in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. For an excellent discussion of the growth of empirical social inquiry, see RICHARD TOMPSON,
THE CHARITY COMMISSION AND THE AGE OF REFORM 42-50 (1979).
4. An Act for Procuring, upon Oath, Returns of all Charitable Donations, for the Benefit of Poor
Persons, in the Several Parishes and Places Within that Part of Great Britain Called England (Return of
Charitable Donations Act), 26 Geo. 3, c. 58 (1786) (Eng.).
5. DAVID OWEN, ENGLISH PHILANTHROPY 1660-1960, at 86 (1964). This statute supplemented
"another Act, passed shortly before, which called upon overseers to report statistics on Poor Law ex-
penditures for 1783-1785." Id. (citing An Act for Obliging Overseers of the Poor to Make Returns,
upon Oath, to Certain Questions Specified Therein, Relative to the State of the Poor, 26 Geo. 3, c. 56
(1786) (Eng.)). Parishes were not expected to provide detailed information but to indicate .'by whom,
when, and in what Manner, and for what particular Purpose' each benefaction had been made, to distin-
guish between those in land and in money, and to specify the annual [income] of each." Id. (citing 26
Geo 3, c. 58).
6. Id. The report to Parliament in a familiar refrain noted:
[Ulpon the face of the said Returns many of the said Charitable Donations appear to have
been lost; and that many others of them, from neglect of payment, and the inattention of those
persons who ought to superintend them, are in danger of being lost, or rendered very difficult
to be recovered; and that the matter seems to be of such magnitude, as to call for the serious
and speedy attention of Parliament, to amend and explain the [Gilbert] Act, by specifying
with certainty and precision the objects to which they may think fit to direct their enquiries, in
order to procure full and satisfactory Returns, and the establishment of such measures as may
be effectual for the relief of poor persons who were the objects of those Donations, and for
carrying the charitable and benevolent purposes of the Donors into execution.
Report from the Committee on Charitable Donations for the Benefit of Poor Persons, 9 REPS. COMMS.
OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 733 (1788).
7. TOMPSON, supra note 3, at 90-91.
8. An Act for the Registering and Securing of Charitable Donations (The Charitable Donations
Registration Act), 52 Geo. 3, c. 102 (1812) (Eng.).
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dred plus registrations after two years of operation.9 Many decades would
pass before any concrete vehicle was put into place to assure accountabil-
ity. Despite the inadequacies of the Gilbert Returns and of the local surveys
in the eighteenth century, these efforts did draw attention to the charitable
sector, its waste and inefficiency, and deficiencies in the administration of
charitable trusts. Correction of charitable abuses could only be achieved
through a proceeding brought in Chancery involving the Attorney General
acting on information supplied by an individual complainant who often had
to pay mightily for his efforts. 10 The Attorney General assumed more of a
role of mediator in these circumstances than plaintiff or prosecutor.lI Un-
der the English practice, if a suit was unsuccessful, the person bringing the
complaint would have to pay the legal costs of the victor, a strong disincen-
tive to all but the most determined. The information was even more tardy,
costly, and frustrating. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, there
were some modest efforts at reform, efforts that led to little substantive
change. 12 Oversight of charities remained a matter of great laxity.
A. Chancery Discontents
The Chancery Court was supposed to correct the inflexibility of the
common law courts and to provide remedies where the common law did
not apply. However, the "equity" of the court had almost disappeared under
a mass of cumbersome rules and practices. Eldon, the Lord Chancellor, 13
9. TOMPSON, supra note 3, at 91. The statute excluded charitable trusts not secured on land and
those that gave the donors or fiduciaries discretion in the expenditure of such funds. Id. at 92.
10. OWEN, supra note 5, at 182. The Attorney General represented the crown in its character of
parens patriae, was the protector of charities (as the property of the public), and could sue ex officio by
information for the reform of abuses to which charities might be subject. The Attorney General alone
could bring suit, but he might be sent into action by an individual complainant about the administration
of any charity, in which case such person would appear as relator in the suit. RICH4ARD EDMUND
MITCHESON, CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THE JURISDICTION OF THE CHARITY COMMISSION 3-4 (1887).
11. See Ludlow (Corporation of) v. Greenhouse, 4 Eng. Rep. 780, 791 (1827); JONES, supra note
1, at 161.
12. See 52 Geo. 3, c. 102 (requiring the central listing of endowments in the hopes of preventing
their loss); An Act to Provide a Summary Remedy in Cases of Abuses of Trusts Created for Charitable
Purposes (The Charities Procedure Act), 52 Geo. 3, c. 101 (1812) (Eng.). The Charities Procedure Act
was intended to provide a summary remedy in cases of breach of trusts created for charitable purposes,
but in the context of Chancery practice, this meant very little. Id.; OWEN, supra note 5, at 183.
13. Lord Eldon, (1751-1838) born John Scott, was Lord Chancellor for much of the period of
1801-1827. He was an inflexible conservative who opposed Roman Catholic political emancipation,
the abolition of imprisonment of debtors, the abolition of the slave trade, and any reform of the Chan-
cery Court. Eldon harmonized and systemized Equity. The delays in Chancery under his administration
were notorious. In Holdsworth's words: "Lord Eldon would often express a clear opinion after hearing
the argument, and then as Campbell says, 'he expressed doubts-reserved to himself the opportunity for
further consideration-took home the papers-never read them-promised judgment again and again-
and for years never gave it-all the facts and law connected with it having escaped his memory."' I
W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 437-38 (3d ed. 1922) (citation omitted) [hereinafter
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opposed as long as possible all changes in an antiquated system that caused
loss and misery to thousands of suitors. Chancery cases resembled Dick-
ens' famous Jarndyce v. Jarndyce. "Twenty years was not an unusual
length for a Chancery case."
14
By the nineteenth century, Chancery procedure had become more
elaborate, dilatory, technical, and ineffective. A Chancery suit could bank-
rupt a charity and its trustees. 15 The court was understaffed, and during the
eighteenth century the rules of procedure became an esoteric body of
knowledge known only to the officials of the court. 16 The backlog of in-
formations was so great that members of Parliament began to complain,
often illustrating Chancery's deficiencies with descriptions of fiduciary
misdeeds involving charitable trusts. In 1812, a member of Parliament,
Michael Angelo Taylor, criticized the delays, noting that the business of
Chancery only had increased in the instance of bankruptcy cases. He at-
tacked Lord Eldon for his lack of talent for reaching a quick decision, a
charge which, though true, doomed the motion to investigate.
17
The situation for obtaining charitable accountability through an action
in Chancery was dire. In 1818, Sir Samuel Romilly, 18 a leading Whig re-
I HOLDSWORTH]. For a description of Eldon's life and achievements, see 13 SIR WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 595-638 (AL. Goodhart & H.G. Harbury eds., 1971)
[hereinafter 13 HOLDSWORTI-].
14. WOODWARD, supra note 2, at 471-72. An interesting comment on the state of equity j urisdic-
tion was that when a prizefighter put his opponent at his mercy, he was said to hold him "in chancery."
Id. at 472 n.I. Lord Eldon gave in to public opinion in 1812 and agreed to allow an additional judge to
catch up on some of the arrears in his own court, but the procedure of the court remained unchanged
until Lord Henry Peter Brougham suggested whole scale legal reform in 1828. Shortly thereafter,
Brougham became Lord Chancellor and Chancery reform occurred. Id. at 472; see infra p. 731.
15. Speaking on a bill in 1846 to create a permanent charity commission, Lord Wrotlesley spoke
of Chancery interference and problems:
[I]n the Bushbury Grammar School, the income of which is £98, there was a suit for appoint-
ing trustees, for an account, and for removing the master. The suit lasted for 23 years; for
twelve years there was no school, and the charity houses were in ruins, and the costs were
£1,171. Again, in the Hayward Charities: in 1831, the master of the school received notice to
quit the premises; he disregarded that notice, and he disregarded three successive notices to
quit.... [T]he trustees then, very unadvisedly proceeded to eject him by force. For this he
brought an action; a second action was brought by his wife, a third by his son, and a fourth by
his daughter, in all four actions, for assaults committed on the expulsion. In 1832, the master
was restored on petition; and on the hearing of the petition, no less than ninety-nine affidavits
were read. Besides these proceedings, there were some in the Exchequer, and a costly Com-
mission to examine witnesses in the country. The costs of one side exceeded £1300 and three
of the trustees were reduced to ruin and their property sold.
86 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1846) 806-07.
16. See 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 338-43, 370-71 (1926) (citing
Report of the Chancery Commissioners of 1850, 21 PARL. PAPERS 5-10 (1852)).
17, 23 PARL. DEB. (1st ser.) (1812) 58-59. Taylor pointed out that in Hilary Term 1812, only five
decrees were pronounced and no appeals were decided, yet one hundred cases and thirty-nine appeals
arrived from the Master of the Rolls, who in the same period made 102 decrees. Id.
18. Samuel Romilly (1757-1818), privately educated, was admitted in 1778 to Gray's Inn and
called to the Bar in 1783. In 1806, he became solicitor general and a member of Parliament. He sup-
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
former, could state: "it was impossible, through the Court of Chancery, to
obtain redress for the abuses of charitable institutions." 19 In the end it was
often the innocent relators who were ruined because of the delays and the
ongoing costs of Chancery procedure.
20
An effort to deal expeditiously with breaches of charitable trusts was
proposed by Romilly. A statute, passed in 1812, provided that upon a
breach of a charitable trust, two or more persons could present a petition to
the Lord Chancellor or Master of the Rolls, 2 ' and they were required to
hear the petition in a summary manner.22 It didn't work. Lord Eldon inter-
preted the statute so restrictively that it was ineffective. 23 In 1819, it was
provided that the Charity Commissioners could certify, and refer to the
Attorney General, matters involving breaches of trust24 or any other cause
of complaint, for which orders or discretion of the Court of Chancery were
necessary.25 This was to be a summary procedure, but giving the matter to
Chancery meant little in terms of expedition.
26
The ever-increasing backlog of Chancery cases led to the creation in
1813 of a Vice-Chancellor to assist the Chancellor. 27 This, however, actu-
ported law reform attempting to amend the criminal law. On the death of his wife, he shut himself up in
his house and committed suicide. 17 THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 188-91 (Leslie
Stephen & Sidney Lee eds., 1917). See 13 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 274-81 for a vignette.
19. 38 PARL. DEB. (2d ser.) (1818) 1230-31. There was little independent enforcement by the
Attorney General. See JONES, supra note 1, at 161. If someone brought an information to enforce a
charitable trust, it was almost always brought by the Attorney General ex rel or on relation of an indi-
vidual who bore the crown's costs, Id. (citing Ludlow (Corporation of) v. Greenhouse, 4 Eng. Rep. 780,
791 (1827)). Charitable trustees' expenses were paid from the charity's endowment. Id.
20. Henry Brougham, infra p. 731, in his motion to establish a commission to educate the poor
discussed the difficulties of using Chancery, 38 PARL. DEB. (2d ser.) (1818) 1221, and Taylor in 1827
noted that hundreds and hundreds had been ruined by the Court. 17 PARL. DEB. (new ser.) (1827) 257.
21. The Lord Chancellor is an officer of state who presides over the House of Lords and heads the
judiciary. As a cabinet minister, he has control over judicial appointments. The Lord Chancellor is also
president of the Chancery Division and a member of the Court of Appeal. The Master of Rolls is the
most important of the Lord Chancellor's assistants in the Court of Chancery, so called because he was
responsible for the records, originally on rolls of parchment. Initially, Master of Rolls advised the
Chancellor in the Chancery Court, and, in 1729, he became a second judge in Chancery. Since 1881, the
Master of the Rolls has been a judge of the Court of Appeal.
22. An Act to Provide a Summary Remedy in Cases of Abuses of Trusts Created for Charitable
Purposes (The Charities Procedure Act), 52 Geo. 3, c. 101 (1812) (Eng.).
23. See In the Matter of the Masters, Governors, and Trustees of the Bedford Charity, 36 Eng.
Rep. 696 (1819) (noting that petitioner under statute had to have direct interest); Attorney General v.
Green, 37 Eng. Rep. 391, 391 (1820) (holding that an information and a petition could not proceed
together under the Charities Procedure Act); Exparte Skinner, 35 Eng. Rep. 1013, 1013 (1817) (hold-
ing that the Charities Procedure Act does not apply if the breach of trust was not by trustee); see also
JONES, supra note 1, at 165-67.
24. See infra pp. 737-38.
25. An Act for Giving Additional Facilities in Applications to Courts of Equity, Regarding the
Management of Estates or Funds Belonging to Charities, 59 Geo. 3, c. 91 (1819) (Eng.).
26. See JONES, supra note 1, at 168 n.4.
27. An Act to Facilitate the Interests of Justice, 53 Geo. 3, c. 24 (1813) (Eng.).
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ally slowed things down as the new official could only decide cases spe-
cially delegated to him by the Chancellor, and the parties could thereafter
appeal to the Chancellor, thus prolonging the process even more.28 As a
result of repeated motions in Parliament, a commission was appointed in
1824 to inquire into the state of the court, but the head of the commission
was none other than Lord Eldon, the Chancellor! To little surprise, the
Commissioners concluded that they were satisfied that:
much misconception has arisen relative to the causes of that delay... that
much of it is imputable, neither to the court, nor to its established rules of
practice; but to the carelessness of some parties, the obstinacy or knavery
of others, or the inattention or ignorance of agents.
29
No reference was made to the lack of judicial staff or to Chancery
procedure.
Not until the 1830s was Chancery procedure reformed. Over the years,
certain responsibilities of the court were hived off: additional judges were
appointed; the Court of Appeal was established; and the staffing reorgan-
ized. At last, at midcentury, there was substantial reform of Chancery prac-
tice, but an unintended consequence was that these efforts slowed down the
creation of a permanent Charity Commission.30 Even though these court-
based corrections were and continued to be tried, nonetheless, it was clear
from around 1820 on that reform of charitable trusts would have to occur
through parliamentary action rather than through the courts.
B. The Impetus for Reform of Charitable Trusts
As the industrial revolution spread from London and Bristol through-
out the country, doubts about the efficacy of private charity had arisen. It
had long been clear that voluntary charity alone would be insufficient to
meet the needs of the poor.31 As a way station to the modem idea that the
government is the primary source of support for the indigent, the common
wisdom was: if wasted or misappropriated charitable assets could be recov-
ered, they might be used to cure social ills, reducing the need for public
monies. 32
28. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 442.
29. Id. (quoting Report of the Chancery Commission 9 (1826)).
30. See An Act to Abolish the Office of Master in Ordinary of the High Court of Chancery, and to
Make Provision for the More Speedy and Efficient Despatch of Business in the Said Court, 15 & 16
Viet., c. 80 (1852) (Eng.); An Act to Amend the Practice and Course of Proceeding in the High Court of
Chancery, 15 & 16 Vict., c. 86 (1852) (Eng.); 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 16, at 375-76; ToMPSON,
supra note 3, at 206-07.
31. This had been recognized as far back as 1601 with the passage of the Poor Law, which raised
taxes to assist the worthy poor. An Act for the Relief of the Poor, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2 (1601) (Eng.).
32. See TOMPSON, supra note 3, at 58-59.
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Though the nineteenth century was a period of startling new develop-
ments, certain persistent problems remained. The first quarter of the cen-
tury was a golden era of chicanery involving charities. A common problem
was that property left to trustees to administer for the benefit of the poor
had appreciated enormously in value. The beneficiaries of the charitable
trusts received the sum originally bequeathed, but the trustees took the
remainder. The great universities and public schools were part of this tactic
of misappropriation, as was the Church of England.
33
The episodic efforts to document charitable trusts in the eighteenth
century showed that assets had disappeared or been misappropriated at an
alarming rate, and the misapplication of charitable assets was commonly
known. In 1795, Lord Kenyon noted the lamentable state to which gram-
mar schools were reduced: "empty walls without scholars, and every thing
neglected but the receipt of the salaries and emoluments. ' '34 Even Lord
Eldon, who opposed all change and specifically anything that might alter
the timeless privileges of visitation35 or Chancery with its horrendous back-
log, the latter of which he was a prime cause, stated "Charity Estates all
over the kingdom [were] dealt with in a manner most grossly improvident;
amounting to the most direct breach of trust."
'36
33. Though the clergy were frequent perpetrators of this practice, in the early nineteenth century,
the church was a foundation of society if not of the Conservative and later the Tory Party and nearly
sacrosanct from criticism. FRANCES -IAWES, HENRY BROUGHAM 107 (1957); G.F.A. BEST, TEMPORAL
PILLARS: QUEEN ANNE'S BOUNTY, THE ECCLESIASTICAL COMMISSIONERS, AND THE CHURCH OF
ENGLAND 70-71 (1964). One writer has described the late-Victorian Church of England as "The Tory
Party at prayer." ANDREW ROBERTS, SALISBURY: VICTORIAN TITAN 26 (1999).
34. The King v. The Archbishop of York, 101 Eng. Rep. 664, 665-66 (1795).
35. With antecedents in Roman and Canon Law, perhaps the oldest device for monitoring charita-
ble activity is the right of visitation, the authority of a founder of a charity to examine the conduct of the
organization or the affairs of a church or a religious foundation or society in order to prevent or correct
abuses. Roscoe Pound, Visitatorial Jurisdiction over Corporations in Equity, 49 HARV. L. REV. 369
(1936). Under canon law, visitations of parishes and dioceses took place to correct abuses. The Case of
Sutton's Hospital, 77 Eng. Rep. 937, 971 (1613); Pound, supra, at 371. After the Reformation, ecclesi-
astical corporations were subject to visitation by the bishop and lay or private charitable corporations by
the founder and his heirs unless otherwise provided. Pound, supra, at 371. Corporations in the Middle
Ages were religious or municipal. Under common law, religious houses were subject to visitation by the
bishop. Later, the monasteries were excepted from visitation but religious and charitable foundations
were not. For other corporations, the visitorial power was in the king, exercisable though a writ of
mandamus and by information in the nature of quo warranto in The King's Bench. Philips v. Bury, 87
Eng. Rep. 289, 298-99 (1694). The theory of the king's visitation right is asparens patriae, as power of
the state exercisable by judicial scrutiny and application ofjudicially administered remedies, by legisla-
tion providing for investigation of the activities and correction of the abuses committed or suffered by
the corporate authorities, and by their administration. Pound, supra, at 372. The visitation power derives
from the recognition that the founder of a charity and his heirs retain some control of the administration
of his gift. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 416 (2d ed. rev.'1991). The founder or visitor could inquire into and correct all irregulari-
ties and abuses that may arise. Id.
36. The Attorney-General v. Griffith, 33 Eng. Rep. 406, 411 (1807).
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C. Sir Henry Peter Brougham and the Creation of the Brougham
Commissions
From 1786, when the Gilbert Returns were filed and public attention
first was called to the status of charities, little was done to uncover their
real condition. Cases of abuse and spoliation were occasionally exposed by
proceedings. It was known that in many instances charitable lands were
leased to the friends of trustees, and not infrequently to trustees themselves,
but the charities involved in such activities generally were obscure.
37
The extent of charitable fiduciaries' misdeeds was publicized by a
Scottish politician, Henry Peter Brougham, one of the more remarkable
figures in nineteenth-century English public life. Brougham (1778-1868), a
lawyer, inventor, leading Whig politician, and reformer, was educated at
the University of Edinburgh and was a founder of the Edinburgh Review in
1802, a leading journal of the day. He was a member of the Scottish and
English Bars and became a member of Parliament as a Whig in 1810.
Brougham served as legal advisor and defender to Queen Caroline in the
annulment action initiated by King George IV. A noted orator and re-
former, Brougham criticized the slave trade and urged educational, parlia-
mentary, and legal reform. A founder of the University of London and the
Society for Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, which made books available at
low prices to the working class, Brougham became Lord Chancellor in
1830 and commenced the effective reform of Chancery. He became the
primary force behind the creation of the Charity Commission. 38 According
to Professor Woodward, Brougham had many of the qualities of a leader:
"He was quick, versatile, sharp in debate, but too rash in temper and judg-
ment," and distrusted by the Whig magnates, who were "jealous of his
parliamentary reputation and disliked his novel habit of introducing sub-
jects like education into the business of the House."'39 His strong commit-
ment to reform and argument, his middle class origins, and his undisguised
ambition caused others to view him with distrust throughout his career.
40
37. J.P. FEARON, THE ENDOWED CHARITIES: WITH SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER
LEGISLATION REGARDING THEM 8-9 (1855).
38. See generally CHESTER W. NEW, THE LIFE OF HENRY BROUGHAM TO 1830 (1961); HAWES,
supra note 33; TROWBRIDGE H. FORD, HENRY BROUG-AM AND HIS WORLD: A BIOGRAPHY (1995);
TROWBRIDGE H. FORD, CHANCELLOR BROUGHAM AND HIS WORLD: A BIOGRAPHY (2001).
39. WOODWARD, supra note 2, at 56. The political diarist C.C. Greville said of him: "Brougham
is... a... very remarkable instance of the inefficacy of the most splendid talents, unless they are
accompanied with other qualities, which scarcely admit of definition, but which must serve the same
purpose that ballast does for a ship." 1 THE GREVILLE MEMOIRS 1814-1860, at 196 (Lytton Strachey &
Roger Fulford eds., 1938).
40. See 13 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 195-200 for an excellent vignette of Brougham.
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Despite a constant enthusiasm for causes, and the general suspicion
that many were generated by political opportunism rather than principle,
Brougham did have two long-time interests: legal and educational reform.
These became united when he focused on the administration of charitable
endowments and their abuse by opportunistic fiduciaries. Brougham pri-
marily was interested in education, particularly-in the blunt language of
the times-for the "lower orders of society." He pointed out that 120,000
children in London alone were without a means of education and between
two and four thousand were rented out by their parents to professional beg-
gars! 41 As a lawyer, Brougham was appalled by the laxity with which
charitable trusts were handled and believed that if charitable trusts were
more properly administered, their resources could be marshaled to provide
the country with a better educational system. 42 In May of 1816, Brougham
proposed a Select Committee on the Education of the Lower Classes in the
Metropolis (i.e., London), which was readily agreed to by Parliament.43
The original 1816 Committee amassed a store of information on the
subject matter of education. Additionally, unsolicited testimony poured in
from around the country that charitable endowments were grossly misap-
propriated, diverted, and used for every purpose save education of the
poor.44 The Committee's report found numerous abuses, 45 and Brougham
soon found deficiencies in schools outside of London. What began as the
rumbling of distant artillery in the effort to create the original committee to
"inquire into the education of the lower orders in the metropolis" became a
close-at-arms fire-fight when Brougham introduced a bill to investigate all
charities and to expand the investigation of education of the poor beyond
London.
In an effort to place the Committee on a more permanent footing with
a grander mission, Brougham used the tools of the rabble-rouser by fling-
ing accusations with an underpinning of truth, but which were difficult to
counter in the context of parliamentary debate. Sometimes a very different
interpretation emerged when the truth was pursued by an investigation. In
debate Brougham outlined some of the abuses involved with charitable
trusts:
41. NEW, supra note 38, at 211. Brougham's Practical Observations upon the Education of the
People (1825) sold 50,000 copies in a few weeks and quickly went through twenty editions. ASA
BRIGOS, THE AGE OF IMPROVEMENT 1783-1867, at 223 (1959).
42. OWEN, supra note 5, at 184.
43. 34 PARL. DEB. (2d ser.) (1816) 633; ROBERT STEWART, HENRY BROUGHAM, 1778-1868: His
PUBLIC CAREER 122-23 (1986).
44. STEWART, supra note 43, at 122-23.
45. 34 PARE. DEB. (2d ser.) (1816) 1230-34.
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" In Charles I's reign, £4000 were left for the use of a school.
Land was purchased, but the amount of rent received was only
£196, five percent on the original purchase 150 years before
and only £10 more than the land received a few years after the
Restoration. 4
6
* Other schools and charities possessed lands valued in the
thousands of pounds, but they were let for very small sums or
for extraordinarily long periods.
* Charitable funds disappeared.
47
* In the county of Norfolk, a school was founded in 1680 for
educating forty children. None were taught; the estates pro-
duced £300 per year, and the accounts had not been audited
for thirty years. 48
* In other cases, schools lapsed, but teachers remained, still re-
ceiving their sinecures.49
" A charity had special visitors appointed who had not attended
to their duties in twenty years.
" In some cases, schoolmasters received a salary but did no
teaching. The funds were intermingled, and the trustees de-
ceased. In others, the trustees were alive but had pocketed the
endowment. 50
Brougham, to no challenge in Commons, stated: "I hold in my hand
forty or fifty more instances of abuse, extracted from the numerous returns
made by the resident clergy." 5' In the course of debate, Brougham listed
several classes or types of fiduciary wrongdoing and reasons why the re-
turns of charitable assets were lower than they should have been:
1) Trustees have insufficient powers for the profitable man-
agement of the funds under their care. For example, they
could not sell or exchange lands in the middle of towns.
52
46. 38 PARL. DEB. (2d ser.) (1818) 595-99.
47. Id. at 599.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 600-02, 761-62.
50. Id. at 1219.
51. Id. at 599.
52. Presumably this was so because they had to go to Chancery in a cy pres petition that was
expensive and would take a very long time. The theory of cy pres is that when a charitable purpose
becomes impossible, inexpedient, impracticable of fulfillment, or already accomplished, equity will
permit the trustee to substitute another charitable object that approaches the original purpose as closely
as possible. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 35, § 431. Related to cy pres is the doctrine of deviation,
under which a court may alter the administrative or procedural provisions of a trust. The deviation
doctrine is applied if it appears that owing to circumstances not known to the settlor nor anticipated by
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2) There was a diminution of revenue because of loss of
property through defects in the original charitable instru-
ment and a consequent extinction of the trustees without
the possibility of supplying their replacements.
3) Trustees exhibited negligence in all its branches, including
carelessness, ignorance, indolence, and omission.
4) Various kinds of wilful abuses.
53
Brougham urged that his committee examine education and charities
throughout the land.54 The expanded Commission passed in Commons, but
the bill was eviscerated in the House of Lords by granting exemptions to
universities and institutions that had visitors. Some of the most egregious
violations involved charities and schools where the visitors did not visit.
Nor could the Commission bring legal proceedings. Finally, appointed to
the Commission were some of the proposal's greatest opponents. 55
In response to the watering down of the new Commission, Brougham
published A Letter to Sir Samuel Romilly M.P.: Upon the Abuse of Chari-
ties in October of 1818, which, though a political broadside, went through
at least twelve editions56 and was the most widely read of Brougham's
publications. Brougham not only criticized the emasculation of his Com-
mission but also listed a variety of charitable wrongs. Though Brougham
used specific examples, the abuses enumerated were believed to be wide-
spread. They included the following:
A corporation in Hampshire, entrusted with the manage-
ment of estates above £2000 for the use of the poor, let
them for two or £300 in fines, 57 but there was no ac-
counting how the fines were applied and charitable assets
were used to pay the debts of the corporation.
58
him, compliance would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 381 (1959).
53. 38 PARL. DEB. (2d ser.) (1818) 595-96. Brougham's bill was opposed by Eldon for cutting
back the power of visitors, to which Brougham responded with an attack on Chancery procedure. See
13 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 214-15.
54. 37 PAL. DEB. (2d ser.) (1818) 815-17-
55. An Act for Appointing Commissioners to Inquire Concerning Charities in England for the
Education ofthe Poor, 58 Geo. 3, c. 91 (1818) (Eng.); OWEN, supra note 5, at 186-87.
56. NEw, supra note 38, at 218 (citing HENRY PETER BROUGHAM, A LETTER TO SIR SAMUEL
ROMILLY, M.P.: UPON THE ABUSE OF CHARITIES (9th ed. 1818) [hereinafter LETTER TO ROMILLY]).
57. Fines were equivalent to points on a mortgage. They were an amount paid at the time the
renewal of the lease came up, and as often as not went into the pocket of the trustees. Because of the
fine, which was an up-front payment, the lease renewal was at a lower rate than the market would
permit.
58. LETTER TO ROMILLY, supra note 56, at 8-9.
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* Abuses involving clergy nepotism, misappropriation, and
visitors who did not visit.
59
" Charities with substantial endowments educating or pro-
viding alms for too few given the resources available or
attainable if the property was properly managed. Two es-
tates in Croydon, which should bring in £1000 to £1500,
were worthless because they were burdened by ninety-
year leases. 60
* School lands at St. Bees Cumberland had been let for
1000 years, with an additional lease for mineral rights to
the family of the trustees of the school.
6'
* Abuses that continued because of the weakness of the
legislation approving the Commission.
" Some school masters, often clergymen, would receive a
salary and housing for teaching, but did none. At other
times, a school master might take the salary and lodging,
teach no charity pupils but conduct a proprietary school
teaching modem subjects. 6
2
* Schools which had received educational endowments for
the children of the poor to learn Latin or Greek for entry
into the church benefited the well-to-do; parents of the
poor desiring more practical education for their children
in an industrializing society were not accommodated.
In the Letter, Brougham rolled out the notorious Pocklington school,
which had a large endowment where but one boy was taught, and the
school room had been converted into a saw-pit. Yet, the school had visitors
from no less than St. John's College, Cambridge! 63 Brougham had used
Pocklington before in the House of Commons. 64 Despite the exaggerations
and several pamphlets produced in defense and opposition, the Letter had
an unexpected effect. The government in 1819 adopted almost all of
59. [d.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 12. This controversy dated back to 1742. The Charity Commissioners visited the school
in September 1819, concluded the leasing was illegal, and certified it to Chancery, which in 1827
cancelled the lease. TOMPSON, supra note 3, at I 10-11.
62. LETrER TO ROMILLY, supra note 56, at 10-1 I.
63. Id. at 9-10.
64. Here Brougham was playing loosely with the truth. According to Tompson, fellows from St.
John's had visited the school in 1817, held a public meeting, and made a set of recommendations to the
Master, just what visitors were supposed to do- TOMPSON, supra note 3, at 111-12. At the time the
Letter to Romilly was published, the school had been taken down and rebuilt. However, after the school
was rebuilt, it was found to be educating only twenty boys on an annual income of E1,000. Id.
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Brougham's positions, excepting institutions with special visitors (which
were exempted until 1831). Parliament created a Select Commission on
Public Charities, 65 which in the course of twenty years exposed not only
charitable chicanery but also fiduciary fidelity.
In a typical burst of nineteenth-century English reformist enthusiasm,
the Select Committee on Education of the Lower Orders in the Metropolis
expanded into a commission, known as the Brougham Commission, that
investigated all charitable endowments and conducted a massive survey of
nearly 30,000 charities. The Commission labored for the better part of two
decades, produced forty volumes of reports and cost £250,000 by the time
it finished its efforts. The Brougham Commission's final report appeared in
six parts between 1837 and 1840, and recommended the establishment of a
charity commission, which took Parliament nearly twenty years to adopt.
D. The Brougham Commission in Action
The Brougham Commission was a creation of Parliament and an ap-
pendage of the Home Office with a separate account in the Treasury. In
some ways it reflected the law of unintended consequences, for its charge
was to inquire and report, but it became an agent of reform through its in-
vestigations.66 From 1819, the Commissioners were empowered to certify
cases to the Attorney General for litigation.67 The purposes of the Commis-
sion's inquiries were to determine the amount, nature, and application of
the earnings of estates or funds; and whether by change of circumstances or
by other means, the trusts could not be beneficially applied for their origi-
65. An Act to Amend an Act of the Last Session of Parliament, for Appointing Commissioners to
Inquire Concerning Charities in England for the Education of the Poor; and to Extend the Powers
thereof to Other Charities in England and Wales; to Continue in Force until the First Day of August
One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty Three, and From Thence Until the End of the then Next
Session of Parliament (Charitable Foundations Act), 59 Geo. 3, c. 81 (1819) (Eng.).
66. TOMPSON, supra note 3, at 116-17. There were actually four commissions. The first was to be
devoted to an investigation of educational charities. Id. at 117; An Act for Appointing Commissioners
to Inquire Concerning Charities in England for the Education of the Poor, 58 Geo. 3, c. 91 (1818)
(Eng.). In 1819, the inquiry was extended to all charities and subsequently renewed twice. TOMPSON,
supra note 3, at 117; 59 Geo. 3, c. 81. The third commission was enabled in 1831 and expired in 1834.
TOMPSON, supra note 3, at 117; An Act for Appointing Commissioners to Continue the Enquiries
Concerning Charities in England and Wales for Two Years, and from Thence to the End of the then
Next Session of Parliament, I & 2 Will. 4, c. 34 (1831) (Eng.). The fourth commission was enabled in
1835 and expired in 1837. TOMPSoN, supra note 3, at 117; An Act for Appointing Commissioners to
Continue the Inquiries Concerning Charities in England and Wales Until the First Day of March One
Thousand Eight Hundred and Thirty-Seven, 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 71 (1835) (Eng.).
67. 59 Geo. 3, c. 91, continued and amended by An Act to Continue and Extend the Provisions of
an Act Passed in the Fifty-Ninth Year of His Majesty King George the Third, for Giving Additional
Facilities in Applications to Courts of Equity Regarding the Management of Estates or Funds Belonging
to Charities; and for Making Certain Provisions Respecting Estates or Funds Belonging to Charities, 2
Will. 4, c. 57 (1832) (Eng.).
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nal purposes. 68 The Commissioners prepared annual reports of their delib-
erations, which were published as Parliamentary Papers.
The Commissions were traveling boards usually composed of two
Commissioners and a clerk.69 Throughout the country, the Commissioners
took evidence and testimony on the state of charitable trusts. Circulars were
sent to clergy asking for their knowledge about charitable trusts. The re-
sponse was compared to the information in the Gilbert Returns and the
returns of the 1818 Select Committee. 70 Then the Commissioners would
visit, prepare an advertisement in the local paper inviting people to give
information, 71 send letters to clergy and precepts to others, and attempt to
gain access to documents. If there was any suggestion of fiduciary wrong-
doing, the Commissioners might offer remedial suggestions or turn the
matter over to the Attorney General for enforcement. The hearings were
not private, but few appeared save those invited.72 Beyond the trustees,
most people knew little about charitable trusts in their communities. Bene-
ficiaries were not in a position to challenge or discuss the sources of lar-
gesse. In the words of the vicar Dr. Folliott in Thomas Love Peacock's
satirical novel, Crotchet Castle, "The state of public charities, sir, is ex-
ceedingly simple. There are none. The charities here are all private, and so
private, that I for one know nothing of them. '
'73
In many instances, the use of charitable assets for personal use had the
sanction of tradition. 74 If the Commissioners could not mediate a resolution
of the fiduciary wrongdoing, they could certify an action to Chancery.
There were friendly and hostile actions. If Chancery was the only authority
that could resolve a property or trust settlement, or a declaratory judgment,
an uncontested petition might be entered. If the abuse was maintained in
the face of the Commissioners' injunctions, the Commission could bring
suit by an information through the Attorney General.75 The threat of certi-
68 TOMPSON, supra note 3, at 122.
69. OWEN, supra note 5, at 189.
70. The Select Committee's survey dealt only with schools. TOMPSON, supra note 3, at 132-33.
71. Id. at 133-35.
72. Id. at 137.
73. THOMAS LovE PEACOCK, MAID MARIAN AND CROCHET CASTLE 222 (McMillan and Co.
1927) (1831). Thomas Love Peacock, 1785-1866, wrote several novels that are a mixture of satire and
romance and take place in a country house. He probably is best remembered today, if at all, as Percy
Bysshe Shelley's close friend and executor.
74. TOMPSON, supra note 3, at 141.
75. Id, at 144. Certification of either kind was approved by the General Board on the recommen-
dation of reporting Commissioners. A copy of the report was sent to the solicitor for the Attorney
General who took opinion from counsel, and if counsel so recommended, the Attorney General en-
dorsed and placed the case in Chancery. Id.
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fication was used as a tool for compliance. 76 Sometimes the investigations
of the Commissioners were resisted.77 Not all of the work of the Commis-
sion involved intentional breaches of fiduciary obligation. There were also
cy pres actions, where the original purposes of the trust had failed, times
had changed, or the trust instrument needed a variance.
The Commissioners occasionally faced singular problems, which they
resolved in unique ways. In 1836, a commissioner, Edmund Clark, visited
Symond's Almshouses in Hereford. He found that the almshouse, given for
"four poor men," had passed into the patronage of a Mr. Lewis who dis-
covered that the only persons left in the houses were four women, the wid-
ows of the persons legally placed in residence. A doubt arose in Mr. Lewis'
mind whether the charitable corpus destined for the use of poor men could
be given lawfully to poor women. He consulted with his attorney, and it
was settled between them that the widows must be ejected, and four men
were forthwith appointed to fill their places. In the words of the Commis-
sioner's report:
But a decree and its execution are very different matters. The widows
stood upon the defensive, and when an attempt was made to storm the
premises, the doors were locked and the inmates appeared at the upper
windows armed at all points with very offensive weapons. In short the
widows gained the day & left Mr. Lewis in a dilemma. He could not pay
them because they were not men & he could not pay his nominees be-
cause they were not in the almshouses & he was therefore under the
painful necessity of keeping the money in his pocket-a thing which has
by lapse of time become habitual & he almost fainted when I told him he
would be responsible for the arrears. 78
Commissioner Clark advised Mr. Lewis to place the money in a sav-
ings bank. The Commissioners resolved that Lewis pay the arrears to the
poor men and continue their allowance as it became due. When the widows
passed on, the proper tenants would obtain possession.
79
76. Id. at 145.
77. The situation at Meer Hospital is an example of such resistance. Richard Pretyman, of the
clerical family that gathered preferments the way organized crime families collect carting companies,
was the warden of Meer Hospital in Lincoln. A foundation originally meant to support thirteen poor
persons had been reduced to the relief of six at a cost of £24 per annum. The buildings had completely
disappeared, and since Pretyman had become warden in 1817, he had earned over £14,000 by fines and
the sale of timber. When charity commissioner John Macqueen sought to examine the records of Meer
Hospital, he was refused access by the Dean of Lincoln Cathedral. Commissioner Macqueen, after
extended stonewalling by the Dean, had the case turned over to the Attorney General. G.FA. Best, The
Road to Hiram's Hospital: A Byway of Early Victorian History, VICTORIAN STUDIES 135, 139-43 (Dec.
1961)_
78. TOMPSON, supra note 3, at 190-91.
79. Id. at 191.
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E. The Impact of the Brougham Commission
The Commissioners had enormous flexibility and produced annual re-
ports that were largely fact finding.80 The scope of the Charity Commis-
sion's inquiry was impressive. By 1834, 26,751 charities had been
examined, though half of Wales and six English counties remained un-
touched. 81 Approximately, four hundred had been referred to the Attorney
General for prosecution, most of which were acted on, though that meant
getting involved in the maws of Chancery. 82 Another 2,100 trusts were
reformed or renovated in some way. 83
Though the Charity Commission's inquiry seemed to muddle on for
twenty years with neither plan nor focus, it did serve several important
purposes: increasing the transparency of charitable trusts, bringing malefac-
tors to justice, and reaffirming the overwhelming basic probity of the sec-
tor. While many fiduciaries breached their trust, and many trusts needed to
be reformed or better administered, nearly ninety percent of the charities
examined were in order. 84 The Commission also placed a spotlight on the
scope of charitable assets in Great Britain. 85 It advanced the cause of law
reform by highlighting the lack of clear principles to guide fiduciaries, and
also demonstrated the dearth of effective mechanisms for accountability.
The Commission's investigatory process itself abated some evils in
charity administration, making it unnecessary to commence legal proceed-
ings.86 Many trustees who had been ignorant of their duties or guilty of
nonfeasance focused for the first time on their fiduciary obligations. This
by itself improved the accountability of many charities. The Commission-
ers also offered technical assistance, mediated disputes, recommended
changes in practices, offered suggestions and observations, and, where
needed, occasionally threatened and browbeat trustees. 87
80. OWEN, supra note 5, at 189-90.
81. Id. at 190.
82. Id. at 193.
83. TOMPSON, supra note 3, at 197.
84- Id.
85. An Analytical Digest was printed in the Parliamentary Papers for 1843. OWEN, supra note 5,
at 192. According to the Analytic Digest, the charitable sector surveyed consisted of land of 442,915
acres; funds, bank and India Stock worth £5,656,746; and mortgages and other personalty worth
£1,001,782. Id. Charitable endowments had an annual yield of £1,209,397, and this did not include
approximately 4,000 charities not examined by the Commissioners. Id.
86. 21 PARL. DEB. (new ser.) (1829) 1759.
87. TOMPSON, supra note 3, at 138-40. The most common recommendations related to facets of
trust administration: trustee actions on dispensing income; hiring, firing, and pensioning superannuated
schoolmasters; distribution of income; or recordkeeping. Id.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
A member of the Solicitor General's office and of the first permanent
Charity Commission summarized the work of the Brougham Commissions:
[I]n a very large proportion of the suits, the gain cannot be estimated in
money. The improvement and regulation of schools; the appointment of
new trustees, obliged under the provisions of a scheme to publish annual
accounts in the place of self-constituted bodies, the application to useful
purposes of funds previously squandered in indiscriminate relief; and the
abolition of sinecures, are instances of this kind.8
An ongoing theme, barely below the surface throughout the inquiry,
was the inadequacy of Chancery procedures as a device to remedy abuse or
to encourage the more efficient administration of charitable assets. More
difficult for the Commission than referring misdealing to the Attorney
General, and a problem for the charities themselves, was the lack of a juris-
diction more summary than the equity courts to remedy administrative
problems such as the appointment of trustees, difficulties in the sale or
exchange of property, or oversight of the handling of charitable invest-
ments. 89 The practice of renewing leases of land for fines rather than ade-
quate increments in the rent was deleterious, widespread, and particularly
harmful in a period of inflation of land values. 90 Sometimes charitable
funds for the poor were used to provide relief or to offset parish poor rates,
or charities had outmoded purposes. 9 1
There were persistent problems that the ad hoc charity commissions
could not correct. These included charities with special visitors who ig-
nored their responsibilities and the terrible conditions of the grammar
schools that only could be addressed in a systematic way by a permanent
body.92
88. FEARON, supra note 37, at 23.
89. OWEN, supra note 5, at 194.
90. Id. at 194-95. Sometimes the trustees liked the practice of fines because it lined their pockets,
but often the practice was the result of inertia, ignorance, or habit. Id.
91. Id. at 195-96. Schools often taught poor children Greek and Latin, when in an industrializing
society, children of modest origins needed more practical instruction. In other cases charitable endow-
ments grew and the beneficiaries were too few. At the Hospital of Archbishop Holgate in York, a
Reformation foundation from 1555, the endowment had grown so much that the beneficiaries-poor
people given sustenance-received an annual increment of£94, quite an enormous largesse. Id.
92. The Committee's report of that year illustrated the kinds of problems that afflicted charitable
grammar schools under the existing regulatory structure by describing the situation of the Berkhamp-
stead Grammar School, which even though under the superintendence by a special visitor and adminis-
tered by the Court of Equity, the appropriately titled Master ran without any restraining control. The
endowment was wasted by the costs and delays of legal proceedings. The institution had the resources
to educate a large number of children. However, the Committee found a master and usher, the latter
being the son of the master and appointed by him when a minor; the trustees receiving considerable
stipends from trust property; the school-house dilapidated; no boys being educated; and surplus revenue
exhausted by litigation and other expenses. FEARON, supra note 37, at 17.
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F. The Creation of a Permanent Charity Commission
As early as 1835, the Commissioners proposed the formation of a
Permanent Board of Commissioners for the Superintendence of Charities, a
structure similar to what was eventually adopted two decades later. 93 The
Select Committee recommended the creation of an "independent authority"
in whom many of the powers of the Court of Chancery should be vested.
This body would have two main powers. The first was the preservation and
proper administration of any charitable trusts. 94 The second was to relax
the doctrine of cy pres and give the body the power "to suggest such other
appropriation as might be desirable when the object of a trust [was] useless
or unattainable." This recommendation went beyond traditional cy pres.95
The first power was attained. The second was not achieved until the Chari-
ties Act of 1960.96 Though bills regularly were introduced, a permanent
charity commission was created only after contemporary scandals in the
1840s and early 1850s jarred the public and led to another Royal Commis-
sion that prodded for reform.
97
From 1841 to 1846, Sir Robert Peel's government attempted to pass
legislation that would have acted on the recommendations of the 1835
Brougham Committee report, which inter alia recommended a permanent
charities commission.98 Unlike reform's old antagonist, Lord Eldon, Lord
93. Id. at 13-15 (citing Parl. Papers 449 (1835)).
94. This was to be accomplished by giving the proposed body the authority:
1) to inquire into the administration of any charitable trust; 2) to compel the production of and
from time to time to audit the accounts of the expenditure of any trust; 3) to facilitate the ad-
ministration of trusts both as to the development of property and the direct execution of trusts
by supplementing the powers of trustees when defective; 4) to secure the safe custody and due
investment of the property of charitable trusts; and 5) to control, to facilitate, or to diminish
the cost of legal proceedings taken on behalf of trusts.
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO CHAITABLE TRUSTS, 1952,
Cmd. 8710, 1 82, at 20 [hereinafter NATHAN REPORT],
95. Id. 84, at 21. For a discussion of cy pres, see infra pp. 772-74.
96. An Act to Replace with New Provisions the Charitable Trusts Acts, 1853-1939, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2,
c. 58 (1960) (Eng.).
97. OWEN, supra note 5, at 199. At least ten bills were introduced to create a charity commission.
Id.
98. Robert Peel (1788-1850) made his original reputation as an able and incorruptible administra-
tor when he was Chief Secretary for Ireland in 1812. In 1822, as Secretary of State for the Home De-
partment, he led a comprehensive reorganization of the criminal code. In 1829, after passage of the
Metropolitan Police Act, 10 Geo. 4, c. 44 (1829) (Eng.), Peel created the London police force, who
were called bobbies after him. He is considered the founder and first leader of the Conservative Party.
Peel became prime minister in 1834-1835 and again in 1841. In his second administration, he reduced
the scale of protective tariffs, reinstated the income tax, and repealed the Corn Laws in 1846. The latter
act led to his resignation. See TRESHAM LEVER, THE LIFE AND TIMES or SIR ROBERT PEEL (1942);
NORMAN GASH, PEEL (1976).
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Chancellor Lyndhurst 99 brought forward legislative proposals during 1844-
1846, whereupon they became entangled in party politics. The Lord Chan-
cellor pointed out the inadequacy of Chancery for small charities and of-
fered examples of the ruinous costs. 100 The universities, the public schools,
the hospitals, voluntary associations, and sectarian religious philanthropies
all demanded and received exemptions from these legislative proposals, 10 1
but the guilds against which numerous informations had been filed and
which expended charitable funds on -lavish dinners did not. 10 2 Though bills
were introduced by the Whig government, in the next few years they were
defeated, and, as in the past, the major institutions sought exemption from
their coverage.
The expiration of the Charity Commission did not mean that all chari-
table trusts had been reformed or that the public interest turned elsewhere.
Applications constantly were made by parties seeking redress of grievances
concerning the internal governance of charities.103 These complaints came
by petitions to the, crown and memorials 104 to the Lord Chancellor and
other equity judges, to the secretary of state for the home department, the
Attorney General, the solicitor general, and to members of Parliament,
hoping the latter would bring the matter before the house. 1
05
Under such pressures, in September 1849, the government established
on a temporary basis a more regular machinery for the preliminary exami-
nation of such claims, a Royal Commission of Inquiry under the sign man-
ual. 106 The purpose of the Royal Commission was "to inquire into those
cases [of charity malpractice] which were investigated by and reported
99. Lord Lyndhurst (1772-1863), born John Singleton Copley in Boston (son of the portrait
painter of the same name), served three times as Lord Chancellor. He attended Trinity College, Cam-
bridge where he excelled. Lyndhurst was called to the Bar in 1804. 1e became a member of Parliament
in 1818, Solicitor General the following year, Attorney General in 1824, and Master of the Rolls in
1826. He succeeded Lord Eldon that year. He was little interested in legal principle and was not a judge
for the lawyers but rather for the parties. BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE COMMON LAW 128-29
(A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1984); see 16 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 5-27
(A.L. Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds., 1966).
100. 86 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1846) 747; 85 PARL. DEm. (3d scr.) (1846) 155; OWEN, supra note 5,
at 199-200.
101. In practice, this meant that the only oversight was through a visitation.
102. OWEN, supra note 5, at 200. Even today, establishment charities have often resisted more
efficient regulation. For example, when New York State desired to consolidate a wholly unworkable
registration system lodged in the Secretary of State's office to the Attorney General, a logical reposi-
tory, larger nonprofits opposed the move.
103. FEARON, supra note 37, at 34.
104. Memorials are statements of facts forming the basis of or expressed in the form of a petition or
remonstrance to a person in authority. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 998 (7th ed. 1999).
105. FEARON, supra note 37, at 35.
106. The sign manual was a direction of the crown under the queen's signature and at the sugges-
tion of the Attorney General. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 35, § 432.
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upon by the Charity Commissioners, but not certified to the Attorney-
General, and to report what proceedings, if any, should be taken there-
upon." 107 As it was not appointed under parliamentary authority, it had no
compulsory powers, and its authority was challenged in many cases. 108
In its first report, dated June 25, 1850, the temporary commission rec-
ommended that nine cases should be referred to the Attorney General, who
successfully proceeded in eight. The Commission's existence generated
additional complaints. The Commission urged the government in its 1850
report for "some public and permanent authority, who should be charged
with the duty of supervising the administration of all these charitable
trusts." 109 Bills were introduced annually, but unsuccessfully, from 1850 to
1852.110
There were several reasons for the delay in implementation. One was
that Brougham was behind the proposal. Other reforms and issues over-
lapped and were more important: changes in Chancery practice and proce-
dure, the establishment of the Poor Law Commission, and the
Ecclesiastical Commission."11 The general direction of the reform cam-
paign was really a matter of finding an acceptable formula for the admini-
stration of charitable trusts that would bring some order to trust
management with the least disturbance to existing institutions. The bills
were progressively watered down from an independent commission to a
commission of existing judges to an administrative commission under the
courts. 112 Charitable trust reform was opposed by the church, the courts,
municipal corporations-the latter among the most corrupt institutions-as
well as by the universities, in a word by the establishment. 113 It was one
thing for the Charity Commissioners to terrify the Mr. Lewises, the small
trustees. It was quite another to tackle the big institutions.
107. FEARON, supra note 37, at 35.
108. Id.
109. OWEN, supra note 5, at 201 (quoting Royal Committee for Inquiring into Cases (1849), First
Report 4 (1850)).
110. FEARON, supra note 37, at 38-40.
11I. In 1846, a charities bill failed by one vote and got tangled in party politics and the Corn Law
struggle. OWEN, supra note 5, at 199.
112. ToMPSON, supra note 3, at 210.
113. Id. at 209.
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II. THE CHARITY COMMISSION
A. The First Permanent Charity Commission
Finally in 1853, a bill creating a permanent Charity Commission
passed in Commons, though it was severely watered down in Lords. 14 The
Charitable Trusts Act 1 5 created a permanent Charity Commission of four
Commissioners, three of whom were to be paid and two barristers of whom
were to have at least twelve years' experience. 1 6 The Commission had inves-
tigatory and subpoena powers. 1 7 The Commission could require Trustees to
submit accounts and statements of a charity.' 18 Perhaps the most important
provision was to place the custody of charity funds under the management of
the Commission. The Secretary of the Commission was to serve as Treasurer
of Public Charities, a corporation in which could be vested charity prop-
erty. 119 Additionally, the Act created the Official Trustees of Charitable
Funds to whom charity trustees might give over funds for holding and in-
vestments at no cost to the trustees or the charity.120 The income from the
investment would be returned to the charity and applied in furtherance of
the organization's purposes.
114. The government's original proposal would have permitted the Charity Commission to reor-
ganize "obsolete or vicious" endowments, trusts that had failed, and those which had "tended to the
encouragement of 'pauperism' and 'immorality' two Victorian code words. 126 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.)
(1853) 1016-17. One of the political compromises urged by the government was an exemption for
Catholic charities because of their questionable legality. OWEN, supra note 5, at 201. Many Catholic
charities had been established to provide masses for the dead and were violative of the law against
superstitious uses. Others had failed to enroll under the Mortmain Act of 1736. An Act to Restrain the
Disposition of Lands, Whereby the Same Become Unalienable (Mortmain Act), 9 Geo. 2, c- 36 (1736)
(Eng.). If they were placed under the aegis of the proposed Charity Commission, many such charities
would have been invalidated. 129 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1853) 1158. The exemptions for Catholic
charities were prolonged from time to time by special acts. See An Act to Continue for a Limited Time
the Exemption of Certain Charities from the Operation of the Charitable Trusts Act, 19 & 20 Vict., c.
76 (1856) (Eng.); An Act Further to Continue for a Limited Time the Exemption of Certain Charities
from the Operation of the Charitable Trusts Act, 20 & 21 Viet-, c. 76 (1857) (Eng,); An Act Further to
Continue the Exemption of Certain Charities from the Operation of the Charitable Trusts Act, 21 & 22
Vict., c. 51 (1858) (Eng.). Eventually, Roman Catholic charities became subject to the operation of the
Charitable Trust Act. An Act to Amend the Law Regarding Roman Catholic Charities, 23 & 24 Vict., c.
134 (1860) (Eng.).
115. An Act for the Better Administration of Charitable Trusts, 16 & 17 Vict., c. 137 (1853) (Eng.).
116. Id. §§ 1-2.
117. Id. §§ 10-12.
118. Id. § 10.
119. Id. §§ 47-50. The treasurer of Public Charities was later renamed Official Trustee of Charity
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B. Charity Scandals and Problem Trusts Redux
Despite the efforts of the Brougham Commission, a substantial num-
ber of endowments remained devoted to useless, eccentric, or obsolescent
purposes, or their assets were misappropriated by the trustees. Not all of
these charities were small trusts in the hinterlands. The livery companies of
the City of London furnished a cornucopia of abuses. With a combined
income of £440,000, the livery companies spent £150,000 on public and
benevolent objects, £175,000 on administrative costs, and £100,000 on
banquets. 121
Even more outrageous were the funds used for bizarre, personal, or
outmoded purposes. Ringers at Abbey Church, Bath, had been bequeathed
£50 a year by one Thomas Nash:
on condition of their ringing, on the whole peal of bells, with clappers
muffled, various solemn and doleful changes, allowing proper intervals
for rest and refreshment, from eight o'clock in the morning until eight
o'clock in the evening, on the fourteenth of May in every year, being the
anniversary of my wedding-day; and also on every anniversary of the
day of my decease to ring a grand bob major and merry mirthful peals,
unmuffled, during the same space of time, and allowing the same inter-
vals as before mentioned, in joyful commemoration of my happy release
from domestic tyranny and wretchedness.... And now that dear divine
man-(to use Mrs. Nash's own words)-the Rev. P.B., may resume his
amatory labours without enveloping himself in a sedan-chair for fear of
detection. 122
Other donors to the indigent assured they were remembered by re-
quirements in the trust. One Greene perpetuated his name by supplying
elderly women with green waistcoats trimmed with green lace. A donor
named Gray provided for garbing the poor in gray. 123 Some trusts were
bound by archaic religious or other restrictions, such as the Bristol alms-
house "for five old bachelors and five old maidens 'who are not inclined to
Roman Catholicism.""
24
121. L.T. HOBHOUSE & J.L. HAMMOND, LORD HOBHOUSE: A MEMOIR 171 (1905) [hereinafter
HOBHOUsE MEMOIR]. Arthur Hobhouse was a charity commissioner and a leading voice for reform of
charitable endowments.
122. Id. at 30. A founder at Burton had made a condition for a school under which "[a]ll the chil-
dren are to be taught to read, but none are to be taught the dangerous acts of writing or arithmetic,
except such as the lord of the manor shall think fit," Id. at 30-31.
123. OWEN, supra note 5, at 325.
124. Id. at 507. The breadth of the definition of charity allowed for some bizarre trusts. In one
parish, a trust was created with the direction that half of the income was to be "distributed among
fifteen maidens of the parish who should be the prettiest and most regular in attendance at church, the
other half among fifteen spinsters over fifty with 'like qualifications."' This bequest was sanctioned as a
valid charity except for the beauty qualification. Id. at 322 (citation omitted).
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Occasionally, trusts were founded for purposes that proved positively
pernicious. Such was one created by George Jarvis of Herefordshire in
1793. Apparently distressed by his daughter's marriage, the testator disin-
herited his descendants and left £ 100,000-an enormous sum-to the poor
of three Herefordshire parishes with a population of less than 900. He ex-
pressly forbade any of the funds to be used for a building, such as an alms-
house. 125 The consequence of this largesse was to draw paupers from
neighboring areas and others seeking, not work, but a portion of the Jarvis
bounty. 126 Nor was the Jarvis bequest unique.
The Charity Commissioners regularly criticized trusts established to
give grants to the poor of a particular place. 127 Though some were well
managed, most made little effort to determine need, and the result was the
creation of dependence by the idle poor. 128 The problem for charity re-
formers was the cy pres doctrine, which was still construed strictly in favor
of the intentions of the founders. The Charity Commission never obtained
authority to reform these types of trusts. Its powers were coextensive with
Chancery in the absence of parliamentary action.129 Nor did the Commis-
sion ever receive the power to unilaterally reorganize larger charities, those
with an annual income greater than £50, or to amalgamate thousands of
smaller trusts into an efficient, equally distributed endowment that could
implement a public policy to relieve the poor or aged. Many of the worst
abuses still involved schools. In one with a net income of £792, the head-
master taught three boarders and no others, the under master only attended
when he chose, and the usher taught in an inferior village school.130
Another problem was the trust to benefit poor relations. In England,
but not in the United States, charitable trusts could be established for a
donor's poor family members. 13 1 In the seventeenth century, a London
125. Id. at 76.
126. Id. at 308-09; SIR ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND 40-41, 96-98, 209-210 (1880).
Though the Jarvis bequest was reformed by an act of Parliament in 1852, as late as 1946, Charity
Commissioners were holding a public inquiry into its administration. OWEN, supra note 5, at 76.
127. See TIMES (London), Mar. 19, 1873, at 12b ("The Commissioners repeat their opinion of the
mischief resulting from the expenditure ofcharitable funds in the distribution of doles.").
128. See HOBHOUSE, supra note 126, at 38-39, 195-215. Hobhouse cites Lovejoy's Charity in
Canterbury, part of whose endowment was to be applied to poor, ancient, and sick people not receiving
parochial relief. According to the Commissioners of Education, 500 were receiving relief. As to 113,
the Commissioners could obtain no information, but of the remainder they found 145. Fifty one were
employed and needed no relief, 36 paupers were expressly excluded by the statutes of the foundation
from any such aid, 18 were occasional paupers, 18 drunkards, 17 bad characters, 4 brothel-keepers, and
I convicted felon. Id, at 42.
129. See infra p.751.
130. TIMES (London), June 20, 1864, at 8f.
131. Re Scarisbrick's Will Trusts, 1 All E.R. 822 (Ch. C.A. 1951); Dingle v. Turner, I All E.R.
878, 879 (H.L. 1972). Under American tax law, a charitable class of beneficiaries must be large or
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salter and alderman, Henry Smith, created a complicated series of trusts,
including one of £10,000 for "the poorest of his kindred." The trusts had
invested in Kensington and Chelsea real estate, which were appreciating
rapidly in the nineteenth century, so that the annual return for the poor kin-
dred was £6800. By 1868, there were 412 claimants of varying distant de-
scent to the founder. The trustees were overrun with requests from
Smiths. 132 Though the Charity Commissioners attempted to reform such
trusts, not surprisingly the founder's kin, who often multiplied rabbit-like
over the generations, fought any changes to the trust's original purposes.
C. The Commission's Powers or Lack Thereof
Indeed, there was much for the Charity Commission to do, and it was
readily criticized for moving too cautiously, merely gathering data, and
paying too much attention to the wishes of the founders of the charities.
133
The Commission needed greater statutory authority and more political in-
fluence. It lacked some essential powers. To undertake any action reorgan-
izing a charity (ranging from replacing trustees, to utilizing cy pres, to
altering obsolete endowments), or, if cy pres would not suffice but a more
sweeping restructuring was necessary and the charity had an income over
£30 or was located in London, the Commissioners would have to apply to
Chancery or develop a plan and present it to Parliament for enactment,
which became almost impossible to achieve.
134
Though the Commissioners could inquire and certify matters to the At-
torney General, they had little power to initiate anything themselves. 13 5 The
Commission had no powers to audit. It could not direct charitable assets to
more useful charitable purposes. 136 All actions were taken on the petitions of
others, and most were under the jurisdiction of bankruptcy or county courts
(for trusts of £30 or less income per year). As in the past, the Commission
indefinite enough that providing aid to its members benefits the community as a whole. Thus, a charity
could not be organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as the creator's family. Treas.
Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(ii) (2004). In the United States, trusts for poor relations would be organized as
private trusts and subject to the applicable taxation-
132. OWEN, supra note 5, at 310. A larger sum was established to assist the poor on a national
basis, and still exists.
133. Seeinfrapp.749-51.
134. OWEN, supra note 5, at 202, 205. During the first tifteen years of the Commission's existence,
only eighteen bills passed through Parliament- Id at 207.
135. FEARON, supra note 37, at 53.
136. MITCHESON, supra note 10, at 11. The Commission obtained the power to audit educational
charitable assets in 1874.
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had difficulty in obtaining compliance with the filing requirements. 137
Whereas 40,000 charities had been expected to file accounts, it took a decade
to reach 14,000.138 Unlike modem administrative bodies, it had no powers of
rulemaking. The Commissioners were understaffed, ignored, and isolated.
139
Reorganization schemes had to be presented to Parliament, and bills to
reorganize charities with clerical trustees regularly were defeated in the
House of Lords. The Commission soon discovered the limit of its powers
when it attempted to reorganize charities that were governed by trustees with
political influence. Christ's Hospital at Sherbum, near Durham, demonstrates
the Commissioners' difficulties. The Hospital, established in the twelfth
century for the relief of persons afflicted with leprosy, was headed by a Mas-
ter, appointed by the Bishop of Durham. The original endowment provided
for thirty brethren, half of whom were resident. The property of the Hospital,
largely in land, mines, minerals, and tithes had increased in value substan-
tially. By 1850, the income approached £4700 annually, and the surplus over
expenses (£3000) accrued to the Master without, according to the Commis-
sioners, "the obligation to perform any duty of importance."'
1 40
The Master did not put the money in his pocket but contributed some to
charities in the neighborhood. Still, this largesse was not the purpose of the
original endowment. When the Master died, the Charity Commissioners
proposed that the institution revert to its original intention by reestablishing
the institution for the relief of chronic diseases, a modem analogue to lep-
rosy, which was no longer prevalent in England. The Commissioners'
scheme included the permanent augmentation of the vicarages of the Hospi-
tal, contributions to local institutions for the benefit of the poor, and annual
contributions to the Durham County Hospital. As part of the reorganization,
the Commissioners recommended abolishing the clerical mastership and
implementing a more modem management structure.
This proposal managed to offend both clerical and lay interests. The
Bishop of Durham opposed abolishing the Mastership. Contributions to the
Durham County Hospital were opposed as an improper use of charitable
funds or insufficiently generous, because they were not extended to other
hospitals. The Commissioners brought their scheme to Parliament where
objections by bishops in the House of Lords scuttled the proposal. Then, they
137. Not until 1860 could the Commission board issue orders without court approval. Thus, the
mechanisms for promoting charitable efficiency and accountability were flawed. The Commission
could not persuade charities to submit regular accounts.
138. TOMPSON, supra note 3, at 214.
139. Id. at 213.
140. OWEN, supra note 5, at 205-06 (quoting CHARITIES COMMISSION REPORT, SECOND ANNUAL
REPORT, Supp. Rep. app., at 6 (1854)).
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applied to Chancery in a cy pres proceeding, but the court would not agree to
the proposed change.141 It quickly became apparent that the Commissioners
had little real power.
The only way the Commission could reform a charity, since parliamen-
tary approval of reorganization was nearly impossible to obtain, was to cast
the proposed revision in the form of a cy pres proceeding and go to Chan-
cery. To apply to Chancery, even to replace trustees, remained time consum-
ing and expensive, particularly for smaller charities. The Commissioners had
no power to authorize transfer of funds to the Official Trustees. The Com-
mission needed a summary jurisdiction with similar powers to those exer-
cised by Chancery. Until then, it only had powers of inquiry and suasion.
Rarely had so little been gained after so long a struggle for reform.
D. A Bad Press
The legal authority of the Charity Commission was weak enough. Even
more unfortunate, and somewhat inexplicable, was that the Commission
received negative press almost from its beginning. The drumbeat of hostility
began in the Times as early as June 1854. There were three continuing foci
of criticism: the selection of the Commissioners, their perceived lack of ag-
gressiveness, and the slow pace of reform. 142 The Times decried the contin-
ued misappropriation of charitable assets, often by the trustees, and charged
that the Commissioners lacked vision, decisiveness, and talent to cope with
the array of abuses, and strictly construing their charge. 143 The Times
doubted whether the Commissioners were "sufficiently qualified by their
eminence in any pursuit."'144 It may be that the newspaper's true basis of
criticism was the Commissioners' middle-class origins and lack of political
connections. The Times called on Parliament to investigate the shortcomings,
always a welcome bone to legislators.
141. Id. at206.
142. As noted in the newspaper at the time:
Abuses sleep as soundly as they did before the Commission was established, for the Commis-
sion has been too well bred to wake them. All that we have gained by our great legislative ef-
fort and the expenditure of many thousands a year is the making comfortable provision for
several very respectable persons at the public expense, and the providing an ever ready an-
swer to any one who shall be indiscreet enough to follow the path trod by Mr. Whiston and
drag to light the misappropriation of charitable funds.
TIMES (London), June 22, 1854, at 8. Robert Whiston had uncovered a scandal at the Rochester Cathe-
dral School whereby cathedral clergy had diverted to themselves the appreciation of scholarship funds.
ROBERT WHISTON, CATHEDRAL TRUSTS AND THEIR FULFILMENT (5th ed. 1850).
143. TIMES (London), Mar. 14, 1855, at 9b.
144. TIMES (London), Oct. 26, 1853, at 6c.
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The Times' attacks were not only harmful, but at least with regard to the
qualifications of the Commissioners, demonstrably false. As David Owen
has shown, the personnel of the Commission were highly qualified, though
as lawyers, they leaned toward a heavily legalistic approach. 145 The problem
was neither with the Commissioners nor the Commission, but with the ena-
bling statute. This made the Commission's efforts largely persuasive and
educational. The Commissioners received an increasing number of requests
for technical advice, which they provided, though this was not the systematic
reform the public, press, and Parliament expected.
E. The Charitable Trusts Act of 1860
The Charity Commission needed a procedure to circumvent Parlia-
ment and Chancery and to institute reorganization of malfunctioning chari-
ties. 14 6 It received such powers in 1860. The Charitable Trusts Act of that
year 47 gave the Commission expansive judicial powers of their own for
smaller charities and enabled it "to make such effectual Orders as may now
be made by any Judge of the Court of Chancery sitting at Chambers, or by
any County Court or District Court of Bankruptcy."' 148
145. OWEN, supra note 5, at 203-04. The Chief Commissioner was Peter Erie, brother of the Lord
Chief Justice of Common Pleas, and a conveyancer of great skill, who brought a heavily legal and
judicial approach but was no slacker. As the statute required, one of his associates, James Hill, was
another barrister of twelve years standing and the author of a book on trustees. The third, a clergyman,
Richard Jones, had been a professor of political economy at King's College, London. One of the inspec-
tors, Thomas Hare, was particularly talented. Id. at 203-09.
146. In 1855, Parliament passed some amendments that made some technical corrections and
allowed charities to transfer funds to the Official Trustees without court order. Other provisions that
would have shored up the Commission disappeared as the bill wended its way through Parliament. The
official trustees of charitable funds were granted perpetual succession and their rights and duties de-
fined. An Act to Amend the Charitable Trusts Act, 1853, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 124, §§ 17-28 (Eng.).
147. An Act to Amend the Law Relating to the Administration of Endowed Charities, 23 & 24
Vict., c. 136 (1860) (Eng).
148. Id. § 2; OWEN, supra note 5, at 207-08. These included orders for establishing schemes, ap-
pointing and renaming trustees, and authorizing financial transactions. The Commissioners' reorganization
powers were applicable only to charities with an annual income of £50 or less, about ninety percent of all
charities in number but only fifteen percent in terms of endowment assets. 23 & 24 Vict., c. 136, § 4;
MITCHESON, supra note 10, at 13. For larger charities, proposals for reorganization required the consent
of a majority of the organization's trustees, which could be difficult to obtain if the trustees were involved
in the abuses. Power of appeal from Commission orders was by petition to the Court of Chancery, to be
brought by the Attorney General, a person authorized by him, and in certain cases by any two inhabi-
tants of the parish where the charity was applicable. 23 & 24 Vict., c. 136, § 8. Jurisdiction of the
county courts and district courts of bankruptcy was extended to charities whose gross income was £50
or less- Id. § 1I. This jurisdictional expansion was not much utilized. The jurisdiction of courts of
bankruptcy in charity matters ceased with the abolition of those courts in 1869. An Act to Provide for
the Winding-up of the Business of the Late Court for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors in England, and to
Repeal Enactments Relating to Insolvency, Bankruptcy, Imprisonment for Debt, and Matters Connected
Therewith, (Bankruptcy Repeal & Insolvent Court Act), 32 & 33 Vict., c. 83 (1869). For charities with
income over £50, whose trustees did not wish to apply to the Commission, the old procedures of appli-
cations to the Master of the Rolls and Lord Chancellors, an information brought by the Attorney Gen-
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The Act described the Commissioners' administrative powers as those
of a "Judge of the Court of Chancery sitting at Chambers,"' 149 which gave
them a broad, albeit undefined, role. Though the Act giveth, it also tooketh
away, stating that the Commissioners could not intervene against charities in
contentious cases that properly belonged to a judicial tribunal. 150 One sup-
poses trustees could use this clause to protest against Commission interven-
tion. Nevertheless, from a regulatory perspective, the Commission was
placed on a more secure footing and, at least for charities with smaller en-
dowments, became "a kind of poor charity's Chancery" with the flexibility
but few of the defects of the Chancery Court itself. 15 1 Granting charitable
trustees the option to apply to the Commission rather than Chancery had a
significant impact on reducing judicial caseloads.152 This suggests charities'
trustees had confidence in the Commission, at least compared to the judicial
process. 15
3
From 1860, with the exception of educational and quasi-educational
trusts, the powers of the Commissioners were not extended in any material
way for one hundred years.154 As summarized by the Nathan Report, an ex-
tensive review of the regulation of charitable trusts in 1952, the powers of the
Charity Commission were: (1) advising: giving advice upon the application of
the trustees or others concerned in the administration of a trust; (2) adminis-
trative: giving directions upon the application of trustees or others concerned
in the administration of trusts; controlling dealings with the property of trusts;
controlling legal proceedings by trustees; settling the compromise of claims
by, or against, trustees; (3) supervisory: investigating the administration of
charities, including their accounts, and taking any appropriate further action;
and (4) quasi-judicial: appointing trustees or removing trustees or officers;
eral, or petition in equity court still applied. An Act for the Better Administration of Charitable Trusts,
16 & 17 Vict., c. 137, § 28 (1853) (Eng.).
149. 23 & 24 Vict., c. 136, § 2.
150. Id. § 5.
151. OWEN, supra note 5, at 208.
152. In the first three years, applicants to the Court of Chancery sank from 86 to 18 and applicants
to the County Courts fell from 146 to 1. The Commission proved an economically efficient and speedier
alternative. TIMES (London), June 20, 1864, at 8f
153. Many smaller matters were referred to the Commission. In the first eleven years following the
1860 act, the Commission made 3,404 orders appointing trustees and establishing schemes. It held a
total of £4,772,792 in assets, divided into 6,224 separate accounts, and it transferred £413,934 to chari-
ties. TIMES (London), Apr. 29, 1872, at 1 lc. Prior to the 1860 amendments, the Commissioners had
referred over 200 applicants to Chancery or other courts. Afterwards they sent only 19, but made 280
orders that allowed the Commission to appoint and remove trustees or establish schemes for governance
of charities. TIMES (London), May 4, 1863, at 9e. The Commission's orders allowed avoidance of going
to Chancery.
154. Change came with The Charities Act of 1960.8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c, 58 (Eng.).
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establishing or making schemes within the limits of the cy pres doctrine, sub-
ject to appeal to the Chancery Division of the High Court. 155
F. The Charities of London
Certain societal needs in the 1880s led to a temporary increase of the
Charity Commission's powers. Two groups of charitable endowments occu-
pied much of its energies in the nineteenth century: the parochial charities of
the City of London and the anarchic accumulation of endowments for educa-
tional purposes. 156 Parochial charities were those charities administered by
London's parishes. 157 To reform these endowments the Charity Commission
was granted extraordinary powers that avoided the inefficiency of cy pres,
enabling the Commission to reform charities on a plenary basis. This was
one area where the Charity Commission was successful under any standard.
The charities of London included some of the richest, least effective,
and most obsolescent in England. Because of their political influence and
the changing demographics of the City, they presented particular chal-
lenges to reformers. The two main types of London charities were the liv-
ery companies 58 and the parochial charities.
155. NATHAN REPORT, supra note 94, 97, at 25.
156. OWEN, supra note 5, at 213.
157. The City refers to the square mile around the Bank of England, located on Threadneedle
Street. In the third quarter of the nineteenth century, this area changed from a residential to a financial
services area.
158. Livery companies were founded as trade societies (successors to the medieval craft guilds) to
protect consumers or employers against incompetency or fraud from a dealer or artisan. Later they
served as guilds and controlled the number of new members, fixed prices of their products, and regu-
lated the trade of their members. They formed domestic tribunals and benefit societies. The name
"Livery Company" derived from the custom of each company having a distinguishing dress. J.F.B.
FIRTH, REFORM OF LONDON GOVERNMENT AND OF CITY GUILDS 97-104 (1888); OWEN, supra note 5,
at 276. By the 1870s, the livery charities were ripe for reform. They had an estimated income of not less
than £800,000 at their disposal, divided into corporate income under their discretion and trust income
devoted to specific charitable purposes. FIRTH, supra, at 107. The Mercer's Company had an income of
£82,758 in 1880. The companies ran a substantial philanthropic network of almshouses, schools, and
other charitable activities but maintained they were private bodies and could spend as they saw fit,
OWEN, supra note 5, at 287. As with other charitable assets in the nineteenth century, the Livery Com-
panies' endowments had increased enormously and the money was not always put to efficient use. They
held the most luxurious banquets. A dinner and ball to commemorate the return of the Prince of Wales
from India cost £26,760 15s 6c. FIRTH, supra, app. I, thl. 13, at 148. As early as 1873, Gladstone sug-
gested that the assets of the Livery Companies be appropriated for City of London purposes. The main
result of this challenge was that Livery men, formerly supporters of the Liberal Party, moved to the
Conservatives. In 1880, the Liberal government created a Royal Commission on the Livery Companies,
which, in a split decision, viewed the companies as semipublic and concluded thereby some public
control would be appropriate. OWEN, supra note 5, at 287-88. The inquiry led to little, and the compa-
nies continued as before. However, they were politically astute enough to realize that if they did not
reform themselves, others would do it for them and take away their huge endowments. Id.
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G. The Parochial Charities
The parochial charities were much more venal and vulnerable than the
livery companies. Most of the 1300 parochial trusts predated 1700.159
Many supported anachronistic purposes: funds for ransoming Christian
captives from the Turks or Barbary pirates; for the poor fishmongers in Old
Fish Street, there being no fishmongers there anymore; or for killing lady-
birds on Cornhill.160 Many such trusts were too small to support the costs
of a cy pres action in Chancery. However, because their annual revenues
exceeded £50, the Charity Commissioners could not intervene without an
invitation from the trustees, which they rarely received.
Even trusts less arcane and obsolescent became irrelevant as the City
of London became a place of work, not residence. 161 As the population of
the City shrank, its charitable endowments increased by fifty percent. 162 In
London's financial district, urban renewal replaced working class quarters
with offices, leaving many endowments for the poor but an absence of
beneficiaries. There was a superabundance of churches stuffed with clergy.
They were shepherds without flocks, but the parishes had considerable
endowments that were growing because of real estate's appreciation. Fur-
thermore, these endowments were poorly managed-not corruptly, but
incompetently. The per capita of charity funds was £4 a head, though pau-
perism was greater than in some other areas of London. Churches, with
endowments far larger than necessary and with miniscule congregations,
created a spoils system to expend the income. 163 Most of the funds were
spent for ecclesiastical purposes, such as for repairs. Since many of the
churches had no congregations, the greater part of the money was wasted or
spent for services for which a fee was paid. The minister and clerk made
their appearances, and after waiting a due period of time and finding that
no person attended, they went away and collected their stipend. There were
endowments for sermons to be preached in acknowledgement of the deliv-
159. See W.K. JORDAN, THE CHARITIES OF LONDON 1480-1660 (1960).
160- 261 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1881) 1295.
161. The City of London was about a square mile in area. It contained 108 civil parishes and 61
ecclesiastical parishes. The population had steadily decreased from 112,000 in 1861 to 76,000 in 1871
and to 52,000 a decade later. The parishes were of two classes. Approximately eight toward the out-
skirts had in 1871 a population of more than 6,000 each. 261 PARL. DEB. at 1291 (statement of James
Bryce). There were 109 parishes in the City whose total population in 1871 was only 74,897 altogether.
The Bank of England, standing astride Threadneedle and Princess Street, occupied one whole parish.
TIMES (London), Mar. 23, 1880, at 9d. Other parishes had populations which could be counted in the
tens.
162. OWEN, supra note 5, at 277.
163. Id. at 278-79.
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erance of England from the Spanish Armada and a sermon of thanksgiving
for deliverance from the Gunpowder Plot. 164
Parochial endowments consisted of two categories, ecclesiastical and
general. The former were for the upkeep of the churches and their function-
aries. Nonecclesiastical charities were of two kinds: those created for edu-
cation and a much larger number with funds for general charitable
purposes, principally the relief of the poor through doles-the giving of
money, food, coats, or blankets. 165 Some of the noneducational endow-
ments were outrageous, such as Werk's Charity, established in the fifteenth
century to provide faggots for the burning of heretics. 166 The distribution of
doles was harshly criticized, for clever dole candidates would go from par-
ish to parish seeking relief. 167 Because of the dearth of bona fide poor resi-
dents, eligibility was interpreted loosely.168
Some of these trusts engaged in "self-help" cy pres by using their en-
dowments to provide relief to ratepayers by making a contribution to the
poor rate, thereby reducing taxes. 169 Other funds were used to provide food
and drink for clergy and parishioners. 170 These were such obvious abuses
and so long standing that reformers with more clout than the Charity
Commission raised alarm.171
In the 1870s, reform of city charities became tied to the broader issue
of municipal reform. In the latter part of the decade, some Liberal members
of Parliament picked up the cry, and a Royal Commission on the Parochial
Charities was appointed, which after hearings merely proposed that only
164. 261 PARL. DEB. at 1292-93.
165. Id. at 1293; OWEN, supra note 5, at 279.
166. OWEN, supra note 5, at 279 (citing REPORT OF THE ROYAL CITY PAROCHIAL CHARITIES
COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT, 8, Q. 262 (1880) [hereinafter PAROCHIAL CHARITIES]), There is no
indication that funds were ever used for their intended purposes. Id. at 279 n. 14.
167. See HOBHOUSE, supra note 126, at 30-32.
168. PAROCHIAL CHARITIES, supra note 166, at 143, 152, 194, 226, Q. 4805, 5064, 6388-92, 7401.
Many recipients used false addresses to obtain coal tickets. They sold the tickets at a reduction to
retailers of coal. 261 PARL. DEB. at 1294; see also TIMES (London), Jan. 26, 1870, at 9c.
169. A parish in Lombard Street contributed out of its charities endowment £700 per year to the
poor rate, a charge which otherwise would be paid by the great banking-houses which were situated
there. Another parish spent £1,300 in the payment of poor rates and then borrowed money to repair the
church. 261 PARL. DEB. at 1294. In Allhallows, Barking, it was found that "the distribution of doles on
New Year's-day did not tend to the sobriety of the district." TIMES (London), Mar. 23, 1880, at 9d. In
one case the sum of five shillings was left some 400 years before to defray the cost of a "love-feast" at
which parties at variance should meet and be reconciled. The feast had been supplemented by charitable
funds of the parish, now expanded into an annual dinner at Richmond costing about £60, while a mod-
est bequest of £1 6s 8d, dedicated to the maintenance of some godly, virtuous, and well-disposed
scholar at Oxford or Cambridge, received no addition at all. Id.
170. OWEN, supra note 5, at 280; 261 PARL. DEB. at 1295.
171. Sir Charles Trevelyan was the primary critic. See his letters to the Times from 1870. TIMES
(London), Jan. 26, 1870, at 7b; TIMES (London), Feb. 4, 1870, at 4e.
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surplus parochial funds should be placed in a common pool.172 This was
too little for reformers such as James Bryce who introduced more radical
bills in 1881 and 1882 that would give Commissioners of parochial funds
enormous powers and would free London endowments from parochial and
founder's restrictions. 173 Bryce's proposals were opposed by the parishes,
who argued they should be in charge of any reform.17 4
The Parochial Charities Act of 1883175 appointed additional Charity
Commissioners to act as a temporary commission and to examine all City
charities and categorize them as "ecclesiastical" or "general." If a charity
had both qualities, the Commission would prorate the endowment between
the two categories.1 76 The statute distinguished between live or active par-
ishes on the circumference of the City and a second category of parishes
with substantial endowments but little population. The former parishes
would continue to administer their own charities, though in conformity
with new schemes framed by the Charity Commissioners. 1
77
In the large parishes of the first schedule, small trusts were amalga-
mated and old funds were put to new uses, such as providing for libraries.
Not everything went smoothly. Aldgate, with a charity income of £10,000
annually, was controlled by a small group of opportunistic fiduciaries who
used the endowments for themselves. To forestall the Commissioners, the
ring leased three of the most valuable parish sites to themselves or confed-
erates. This was reported to Commissioners, who turned the matter over to
the Attorney General for criminal prosecution. The Commissioners amal-
gamated three dozen trusts into one foundation and redesignated the
beneficiaries. 178
The Parochial Charities Act granted the Commissioners enormous
powers that they could never obtain from Parliament for their regular re-
sponsibilities. They could reorganize charitable endowments without the
172. 1 PAROCHIAL CHARITIES, supra note 166, at 10-11; OWEN, supra note 5, at 281-82.
173. 261 PARL. DEB. at 1296-97; OWEN, supra note 5, at 282. James Bryce (1838-1922) was a
scholar and statesman. Educated at Glascow and Trinity College, Oxford, Bryce studied law at Heidel-
berg and was called to the Bar in 1867. He was Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford from 1870-
1893. Bryce's American Commonwealth (1888), based on extensive travels in North America, was a
principal political science textbook in the United States for decades. He entered Parliament as a liberal
in 1882, and later served in the cabinet. Bryce served as Ambassador to the U.S. from 1907-1913. He
became Viscount Bryce of Dechmont in 1914. BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE COMMON LAW,
supra note 99, at 84-85.
174. TIMES (London), May 5, 1881, at I Of. The parishes had a bill introduced on their behalf.
175. An Act to Provide for the Better Application and Management of the Parochial Charities of
the City of London (City of London Parochial Charities Act), 46 & 47 Vict., c. 36 (1883) (Eng.).
176. Id. §§ 3,5 5-6.
177. OWEN, supra note 5, at 284.
178. Id.
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necessity of a cy pres action. The myriad trusts were amalgamated and
substantial sums were allocated to useful charitable purposes. The Com-
missioners completed their first task of classification of charitable property
by 1887. The endowments in the first schedule were to be applied by the
parishes according to schemes proposed by the Commissioners for the pur-
poses specified in the endowment statutes. 179 For the charities in the second
schedule, assets initially would be applied by the Commissioners, and
thereafter by a special new governing body for the management of charity
funds for the benefit of the city generally as directed under the schemes
prepared by the Commissioners. 180 The ecclesiastical endowments in the
second schedule were applied to the restoration and support of churches
that lacked sufficient funds. 181 Any surplus would be paid to the Ecclesias-
tical Commissioners.
The decision on the ecclesiastical funds aroused little controversy. The
Commissioners aggregated nonecclesiastical purposes of about £50,000.
The biggest object of the Commissioners' largesse was contributions to the
new polytechnic (vocational) institutions, which provided technical training
for the lower-middle and working classes. Furthermore, they invaded capi-
tal to make additional grants to the polytechnics and directed that the new
City Parochial Foundation should pay these institutions in perpetuity ap-
proximately £22,500.182 This was doubly ironic, for the Commissioners
were supporting a new and yet unproven educational approach for the
working classes after heavy criticism that their educational endowment
reforms were biased toward the middle classes. 183 And, as the organization
that was supposed to reorganize trusts with fixed and outmoded purposes, it
bound the new foundation forever to support a purpose that might itself
become inefficient or obsolescent.
179. In parishes of the first schedule, ecclesiastical property produced £2400 annually; general
charitable property produced £10,500. In the parishes in the second schedule, ecclesiastical property
yielded £37,000, and general charity property produced £57,000. See TIMES (London), Oct. 4, 1887, at
4a.
180. 46 & 47 Vict., c. 136, § 48. The new governing body, "The Trustees of the London Parochial
Charities," consisted of twenty-one members, five appointed by the crown, four by the Corporation of
London, two by the London County Council, two-later reduce to one-by the University of London,
two by the council of University College, two by the council of King's College London, two by the
Ecclesiastical Commissioners, and one each by governors of the Bishopsgate and Cripplegate Founda-
tions which had the largest number of charities taken in by the Commissioners' schemes. See Thorns
(London), Sept. 4, 1889, at l0e.
181. OWEN, supra note 5, at 295. About half of the funds were to maintain the fabric and services
of fifty-five churches. Other grants were for the repair and restoration of churches. Id,
182. Id- at 294. Many of the livery companies also contributed to the Polytechnics.
183. See infra p. 765.
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Their support of the polytechnics again served to agitate powerful in-
terests. A foundation has been described as "a large body of money com-
pletely surrounded by people who want some." 184 The second part of the
Commissioners charge, determining how to allocate the common parochial
pool, proved this aphorism. Some, including Arthur Hobhouse, former
charity commissioner, desired the funds allocated for open spaces. Others
wanted the assets devoted to charity. The Commissioners were besieged by
suitors, particularly the London School Board and supporters of open
spaces. To their subsequent credit, the Commissioners allocated, with the
approval of Parliament, £50,000 to save Hampstead Heath. Other funds
were expended on open spaces. These grants served as seed money and as a
catalyst for other donors. 185
Fortunately, the Foundation's assets increased because of the appre-
ciation of real estate prices. The City Parochial Foundation later was able to
make grants for a variety of community institutions from gardens to the arts
that would reflect well on the modem community foundation in many
American cities.
The reform of the City of London Charities was one notable area of
success in comparison to the Commission's more general record of frustra-
tion and receipt of criticism. The abuses and waste occurring among the
parochial charities were outrageous. There was little argument against re-
form of these trusts. Few lived in the areas where these charities were lo-
cated. The parochial charities effort was part of a broader campaign for
municipal reform. The ability to use cy pres powers meant change could
occur efficiently. The Commission, however, never could build on its past
successes; its efforts at educational reform generated substantial opposition.
H. Charity Administration and Educational Reform
In the nineteenth century, the Charity Commission was linked to educa-
tional reform. In 1873, it assumed the responsibilities of a separate body, the
Endowed Schools Commission. The Commission became involved in educa-
tional reform because of a chimerical belief that there were sufficient chari-
table assets to be tapped to pay for a widespread modernization of public
education. The new responsibilities increased its powers with regard to edu-
cational matters but generated unattainable expectations that hurt the Com-
mission's reputation. Educational reform was controversial by nature,
184. This is attributed to Dwight MacDonald. See JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ,
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 604 (2d ed. 2000).
185. OWEN, supra note 5, at 291-92. As we see from modem matching grant campaigns, the
Commissioners' grants encouraged successful fundraising campaigns by individual polytechnics.
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difficult to implement, and appropriated resources in possession of one group
in society and reallocated them to another, a combustible alignment.
In the mid-nineteenth century, all political parties wanted to restrict
state activity within narrow limits. Yet, even within that limited political
framework, it was recognized that a democratic people no longer could re-
main democratic and uneducated. Without state compulsion, control, and
adequate resources, the democracy would not become educated.' 8 6 British
education in the nineteenth century served as a means of control and security
by the ruling class and as an instrument for securing freedom on the part of
the ruled. 187 The state first connected itself with education in 1833 with a
parliamentary grant of £20,000 in aid of charitable subscriptions for the edu-
cation of the poor.188 In 1839, with the establishment of the Committee of
Council on Education, 189 the state took the first steps toward assuming edu-
cational control. The need for state intercession originally was recognized for
primary education. Without state support, the masses would remain unedu-
cated. 190 When Brougham became interested in the subject in the second
decade of the century, the assumption was that the upper middle classes
would pay for their education, save where endowments had been established
for their benefit. Private benevolence would give the poor training suitable to
their station in life. 191
Educational reform initially focused upon the antiquated governing
statutes of universities, public schools, and smaller endowed schools. At
midcentury, royal commissions investigated different types of educational
institutions and proposed reforms of the existing governing statutes, altera-
tions that were resisted by the schools. 192 Thereafter, a series of statutes im-
186. R.L. ARCHER, SECONDARY EDUCATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 147-48 (1921).
187. HELEN M. LYND, ENGLAND IN THE EIGHTEEN-EIGHTIES 349 (1945).
188. 14 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 125 (A.L. Goodhart & H.G.
Hanbury eds., 1964) [hereinafter 14 HOLDSWORTH].
189. Id. This was a committee of the Privy Council and administered the educational grants.
190. ARCHER, supra note 186, at 149. Elementary education for working class children was hap-
hazard at best. The "Dame" schools were run by elderly ladies who charged a small amount for instruc-
tion in reading, writing, arithmetic, and the Bible. These institutions gave some education to a few
children. There were some charity schools established by private subscribers. In many industrial areas
there were no schools for the poor at all. In 1815, the monitorial system was introduced whereby a
master taught older children, monitors, who then taught younger children. Private societies of a reli-
gious nature provided some schooling. These associations, the British and Foreign School Society and
the National Society for Education of the Children of the Poor in the Principles of the Established
Church, reflected a religious divide that was to bedevil educational reform through the century, It was
to them the government made its initial grant in 1833. HERBERT L. PEACOCK, A HISTORY OF MODERN
BRITAIN 1815 to 1968, at 51-52 (1968). For a growing population, voluntary private organizations
could not hope to meet the educational needs of the times. LYND, supra note 187, at 356-59.
191. OwEN, supra note 5, at 247.
192. ARCHER, supra note 186, at 151-52.
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plemented the recommended reforms. 193 Although school endowments came
under the authority of the Charity Commission under its initial legislation, it
could not undertake major educational reforms. 194 Nor could it deal with
schools in relation to each other, or look at the broader educational canvas, or
attack the need for administrative rationalization and curricular reform. 195 In
the mid-1860s, a Schools Inquiry Commission, the Taunton Commission,
under the chairmanship of Lord Taunton, investigated the conditions of the
nation's endowed schools.
T Endowed School Reform
The existing endowed schools were of three categories or grades. At the
top were the great public schools, whose students graduated at eighteen or
nineteen. A second grade of endowed schools, larger in number, graduated
students at sixteen or seventeen who went into professions or trades. The
sciences and modem languages, the most necessary tools for these students,
were neglected. A third category, catering to the largest number of students,
who left school at thirteen or fourteen, educated the sons of farmers, small
tradespeople, and shopkeepers. 196 The problems of the endowed schools
were many. Though the highest level of schools offered an excellent classics
curriculum, the schools were deficient in the sciences in contrast to similar
institutions in France and Germany, and were monopolized by the rich. 197
For schools of the next rank, a classical education was of little use.
There were enormous disparities in schools' endowments, in their loca-
tion, and in the abilities of their masters. The endowed schools' foundations
dated usually from the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. While the value of
the endowments had risen, the governing documents had not been altered
and were ill adapted for the modem educational needs of an industrializing
society. 198 For example, the endowments might provide that poor children
193. An Act to Make Further Provision for the Good Government and Extension of the University
of Oxford, of the Colleges therein, and of the College of Saint Mary Winchester (Oxford University
Act), 17 & 18 Vict., e. 81 (1854) (Eng.); An Act to Make Further Provision for the Good Government
and Extension of the University of Cambridge, of the Colleges Therein, and of the College of King
Henry the Sixth at Eton (Cambridge University Act), 19 & 20 Vict., c. 88 (1856) (Eng.), An Act to
Make Further Provision for the Good Government and Extension of Certain Public Schools in England
(Public Schools Act), 31 & 32 Viet., c. 118 (1868) (Eng.).
194 If the situation at a school was in extremis-there were no trustees or master, or more likely, no
students-the Charity Commissioners could frame plans cy pres and alter the governing statutes. Such
action was an extreme remedy. OWEN, supra note 5, at 249.
195. Id.
196. 194 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1869) 1356-58 (statement of W.E. Forster, Vice President, Council
on Committee of Education).
197. K. THEODORE HOPPEN, THE MID-VICTORIAN GENERATION: 1846-1886, at 307-09 (1998).
198. OWEN, supra note 5, at 248.
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from the parish were to receive a free classical education, a boon if one was
to go on to the university or into the clergy, but otherwise useless. It proved
impossible to reform archaic foundation regulations through a cy pres pro-
ceeding in Chancery, because of the 1805 Leeds Grammar School case that
prohibited teaching a modem curriculum if the schools' statutes provided for
a classical education. 199 One consequence of the case was that schools with
small endowments that were unable to support a master equipped to teach
Latin and Greek could not apply their endowments to humbler uses such as
the "three r's" or commercial subjects. 20o
Another common problem was that some schools, founded for the poor
of the parish, became the preserve of the upper classes. Harrow, the ancient
public school whose alumni include Winston Churchill, was intended by its
founder to teach elementary classics to any boy in the parish whose parents
wished such an education. By the mid-nineteenth century, its current income
was many times more than would suffice if every Harrovian parish parent
had desired his son to learn classics. However, since the beginning of the
eighteenth century, it had become an aristocratic school.
201
J. Report of the Schools Inquiry (Taunton) Commission
The Schools Inquiry or Taunton Commission issued a report in 1868 on
the bleak condition of secondary education. 202 The Commission's aim was to
secure an efficient education for the middle classes, one which made due
199. Attorney-General v. Whitely, 32 Eng. Rep. 1080, 1081-84 (1805). The trustees of the Leeds
.Grammar School proposed to use its endowment to teach arithmetic, writing, and modem languages in
addition to classics. Lord Eldon held that the Leeds Foundation statutes stated that it was intended to
support instruction in the classics and nothing else. To introduce other subjects was a breach of trust.
For an analysis of the impact of the case and a critique of Eldon's reasoning, see OWEN, supra note 5, at
248-49; BRIAN SIMON, STUDIES IN THE HtSTORY OF EDUCATION 1780-1870, at 105-08 (1960). The
Charity Commission was of no help in such situations, because its limited mandate was confined to
trusts that could not be carried out. Only Parliament could make it possible to alter a charitable trust
whose purposes were not frustrated by creating by statute a variance power for the trustees. As we have
seen, this was extremely difficult to accomplish.
200. OWEN, supra note 5, at 249.
201, ARCHER, supra note 186, at 150. Churchill, for instance, was the grandson of the Duke of
Marlborough. The solution of Brougham and the Whigs to this problem would be to alter the governing
instruments so that all residents of Harrow could receive an education, but the surplus income would be
spent on the school rather than taken for broader educational purposes. Id. at 150-51.
202. Of some 3,000 endowed schools approximately 800 offered education beyond the elementary
level. Most sent no boys on to the universities, and of those that did, only forty sent as many as thirty
students annually. Endowments ranged widely in value, and fewer than half could claim an annual income
off 100. The endowed schools were not distributed in areas where there had been population growth, but in
accordance with the wealth and population of the country in the reign of Elizabeth I. This meant that the
North and the Midlands, the new industrialized areas, and impoverished areas, such as Wales, were under-
served. Less than half taught any Greek or Latin, a prerequisite for entry to a university, despite their
founding statutes. Owen, supra note 5, at 250-51.
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provision for class distinctions while allowing for a controlled degree of
upward mobility.2 03 Its primary recommendation suggested that existing
endowments be used more efficiently to expand the supply of secondary
schools. This only could be accomplished by a revision of existing charity
law. 20
4
The Taunton Commission advocated putting a liberal education within
the reach of all classes. What this meant in fact was that the free places
would be largely abolished and replaced by a more limited number of exhibi-
tions awarded solely on merit.205 For the rest, a fee of about £2 would pro-
vide entry to a local elementary school if it remained open. The extension of
education for all classes was achieved by imposing fees on all nonscholar-
ship winners, ending the free schools and imposing costs that the poor could
not afford. 206 Other endowed funds would be used to allow the elementary
graduate to attend a grammar school.207 These latter exhibitions were worth
approximately £25. Exhibitions based upon merit would come from the ex-
isting endowments. In effect, the Commission proposed that the middle
classes gain a mass education at the expense of the poor.
203. SIMON, supra note 199, at 332-35.
204. The Charity Commission and Chancery were limited to trusts in need of cy pres reform, i.e.,
trusts that could not be carried out. Trusts that were merely inefficient, or had outmoded purposes but
could still be carried out, could only be altered by Parliament, a long, expensive, and often fruitless
effort, because such change might be resisted by the trustees. OWEN, supra note 5, at 251-52 (citing
Report of the Royal Commission Known as the Schools Inquiry Commission (The Taunton Report)
463-69 (1868)). Additionally, the report urged that endowed schools be treated as a group, rather than as
isolated units.
205. At the time of the Taunton Commission, education for the lower classes in England was a
matter of luck. A bright boy from a modest background might catch the eye of a local cleric who con-
trolled "exhibitions" or free admissions to an endowed school, established by a founder centuries
before. An exhibition is a fixed sum of pecuniary assistance given for a term of years from the endow-











o show=10 (last visited Mar. 24, 2005). The student might be able to earn a further exhibition to a
grammar school or the University, thereupon entering the church or the law. For others, opportunity did
not beckon. Scholarships were on the basis of favor rather than merit, though some local schools of-
fered a free elementary education to all children in the area whose parents desired to send them. Even
after the Education Act of 1870, 33 & 34 Viet., c. 75 (Eng.), whereby the state promised to fund pri-
mary education, school attendance was not compulsory.
206. SIMON, supra note 199, at 329-32. One is reminded of the writer Anatole France's comment:
"[The poor] must labour in the face of the majestic equality of the laws, which forbid rich and poor
alike to sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets and to steal their bread." ANATOLE FRANCE, LE
LYs ROUGE ch. 7 (1894).
207. A grammar school is a secondary school equivalent to an American high school in which, at
that time, Latin and Greek were taught.
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K. The Endowed Schools Act of 1869208
The government utilized reform approaches similar to those used in the
Universities2 09 and Public Schools Acts. 210 A special commission, an En-
dowed Schools Commission, was established to approve new schemes for all
of the foundations not covered by the Public Schools Act.2 11 The primary
responsibility of the Endowed Schools Commissioners was to suggest how
existing endowments could be utilized to expand the supply of education. The
simplest approach was to use existing endowments more efficiently to provide
the basis for a national system.212 However, even if all educational endow-
ments were reformed, the funds would be insufficient to create a complete
national system of secondary education.2 13
The authority of the Endowed School Commissioners far exceeded that
of their counterparts at the Charity Commission. They could alter the pur-
poses of an educational endowment, incorporate any governing body or estab-
lish a new one, supercede the powers of visitors save at cathedral schools,
reorganize, provide for, and advance the education of boys and girls. In the-
ory, they could convert a boys' school to a coed or female institution or move
208. An Act to Amend the Law Relating to Endowed Schools and Other Educational Endowments
in England, and Otherwise to Provide for the Advancement of Education (Endowed Schools Act of
1869), 32 & 33 Vict., c. 56 (Eng.).
209. See An Act to Make Further Provision for the Good Government and Extension of the Univer-
sity of Oxford, of the Colleges therein, and of the College of Saint Mary Winchester (Oxford University
Act), 17 & 18 Vict., c. 81 (1854) (Eng.); An Act to Make Further Provision for the Good Government
and Extension of the University of Cambridge, of the Colleges Therein, and of the College of King
Henry the Sixth at Eton (Cambridge University Act), 19 & 20 Vict., c. 88 (1856) (Eng.).
210. An Act to Make Further Provision for the Good Government and Extension of Certain Public
Schools in England (Public Schools Act), 31 & 32 Vict., c. 118 (1868) (Eng.).
211. The government's rationale was that the Charity Commission, whose services were little
acknowledged, had been acting persistently and laboriously but was overworked and had insufficient
powers. Only in the smaller charities did the Commission have jurisdiction and neither it nor Chancery
could consider one school in relation to another or to attempt any system of distribution without submit-
ting a bill to Parliament, which was difficult to carry through. 194 PARE. DEB. (3rd ser.) (1869) 1369.
212. OWEN, supra note 5, at 247; ARCHER, supra note 186, at 169.
213- State support of elementary education was achieved with the Education Act of 1870, 33 & 34
Vict., c. 75, but the creation of a complete state secondary system did not occur until 1902 after another
commission had been formed in 1895. ARCHER, supra note 186, at 169. The Education Act of 1870 was
justified as an attempt to preserve education as primarily a private sector responsibility. The govern-
ment's spokesman on education stated:
Our object is to complete the present voluntary system, to fill up gaps, sparing the public
money where it can be done without, procuring as much as we can the assistance of the par-
ents, and welcoming ... the co-operation and aid of those benevolent men who desire to as-
sist their neighbors.
199 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1870) 443-44. The voluntary sector could apply for additional building
grants. In districts with insufficient schools, elected boards were established to run schools funded out
of the rates. Voluntary schools continued to receive Treasury grants to cover a proportion of their costs.
The cost of the 1870 act was only £1.6 million, 4.1% of government expenditures excluding debt
charges. HOPPEN, supra note 197, at 598-00.
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an existing school to a new location. 214 The reorganizational initiative lay
with the Commissioners. 2 15 Perhaps the most extraordinary innovation was
the commissioners' ability, with the consent of the charity's governing body,
to evade the swamp of Chancery in pursuit of a cy pres ruling. They could
take any noneducational endowment created before 1802 that had arcane and
obsolescent purposes "which [had] failed altogether or [had] become insig-
nificant in comparison with the magnitude of the endowment" and convert it
to educational purposes. 216 In summation, the Endowed Schools Commission
offered a speedy and inexpensive approach to the reform of secondary
education.
2 17
Compared to the feeble powers of the Charity Commission, which ger-
minated over twenty years, the authority granted to the Endowed Schools
Commission was extraordinary. Timing in politics and administrative reform
are as important as in private life. Educational reform was on the political
agenda, and the approach of the statute seemed the most expeditious, cost-
effective, and politically feasible approach. Unfortunately, the Endowed
Schools Act proved far ahead of public opinion.
The Commission ran into criticism as soon as the first Commissioners
were announced.218 Though the fire power was there, the Commissioners
214. An Act to Amend the Law Relating to Endowed Schools and Other Educational Endowments
in England, and Otherwise to Provide for the Advancement of Education (Endowed Schools Act of
1869), 32 & 33 Vict., c. 56, §§ 9-10, 20 (Eng.).
215. Their schemes would go into effect after they were submitted to the Committee of Council on
Education- Id. § 37. If trustees or others were opposed to a scheme, an appeal would lie to the Privy
Council, id. § 39, or could be laid before Parliament. id. § 41. The Commissioners could not interfere
with endowments less than fifty years old or with religious schools or colleges. Id. § 14.
216. Id. § 30. The obsolete purposes included doles in money or kind, marriage portions, redemp-
tion of prisoners and captives, relief of poor prisoners for debt, loans, apprenticeship fees, or advance-
ment in life. Id. Due regard had to be given to "the educational interests of persons of the same class in
life or resident within the same particular area as that of the persons who at the commencement of the
Act [were] benefited," clauses later breached. No open spaces could be enclosed. Id,
217. Endowed elementary schools were excluded from the act. Under the Education Act of 1870,
33 & 34 Vict., c. 75, it became the statutory obligation of the parishes to provide for elementary educa-
tion. The Endowed Schools Commissioners would prepare schemes, forward them to the governing body
of the particular school, and publish the scheme in the local press. Two m6nths were allowed during which
the Commissioners received suggestions and objections. The Commissioners could visit the locality where
the school was situated or send an assistant commissioner and make an inquiry. The scheme was then sub-
mitted to the educational department of the government the Committee of Council of Education. The
Committee would approve or disapprove the scheme. If it was approved it would become law within forty
days. If not, it would be returned to the Commission. 194 PARL DER. (3d ser.) (1869) 1371. The govern-
ment ignored the School Inquiry Commission's recommendations of provincial school boards, and the
power of investigation for the supervisory body. Nor did it grant the Commission the power to impose a
tax rate for building schools.
218. OWEN, supra note 5, at 255. The Chief Commissioner was Lord Lyttleton, Gladstone's
brother-in-law, who one year previously had publicly disclaimed unquestioning deference toward
founder's wills. He had been a member of the Taunton Commission. The second commissioner, Arthur
Hobhouse, later a distinguished charity commissioner, was the author of The Dead Hand (1880), which
recommended strong medicine in dealing with charitable endowments. Both Lyttleton and Hobhouse
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were not happy choices and a strong public reaction arose against them. The
reorganization of endowed schools proceeded at a slower pace than the
Commissioners had expected. 219 Foundation trustees often "fought to retain
their abuses; and, even when a scheme had been drawn up, there was no
inspection powers to see that it was properly carried out."'220 Sectarian fears
were voiced, because the remodeling of governing bodies of the schools
touched the interests of the church, dissenting groups, and parents.221 The
Commissioners aroused considerable resentment. A lack of political savvy
and prudence also undermined their effectiveness. They were outspoken,
impolitic, and overzealous. 222 Reorganizations that were needed the most
were successfully resisted, which affected the Commissioners' authority.
223
There arose sharp differences, and the Endowed Schools Commissioners
were criticized for taking from the poor by using endowments for free
schooling at the elementary level to aid the middle classes, who were more
likely to attend grammar schools. 224 The Commissioners also were accused
of interceding into the affairs of good as well as bad schools.
When the endowed schools legislation was about to expire in 1872,
Gladstone's Liberal government attempted to renew the commission for
were viewed as loose cannons. The third commissioner, a real canon, was H.G. Robinson, a less con-
troversial choice. id. at 256 n.35.
219. After three years, only twenty-four schemes passed into law. Thirty-four had been sent to the
Education Department and eighty-four published. Owen, supra note 5, at 259 (citing REPORT OF THE
ENDOWED SCHOOLS COMMISSIONERS 12 (1872)). At this rate, the Brougham Commission would seem
positively efficient.
220. MARY STURT, T1E EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF PRIMARY EDUCATION IN
ENGLAND AND WALES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 385 (1967).
221. Hoppen wrote:
Schooling in England and Wales was not only a matter of deep religious and sectarian signifi-
cance but one of directly local concern to the bulk of [Members of Parliament] and peers.
[Since the 1830s] a modest system of state aid for what were essentially denominational
schools had grown up, though under it many children still received no instruction at all.
HOPPEN, supra note 197, at 597. Denominational lines were sharpened by the almost simultaneous
founding in 1869 of a National Education Union, supporting the existing denominational system of
schools affiliated with the Anglican Church, and a National Education League, favoring universal and
secular schools. Id. at 598.
222. SIMON, supra note 199, at 328.
223. See OwEN, supra note 5, at 249. Many of the endowed schools had been founded as secondary
institutions but over time had become elementary schools. Often, it was difficult for the Endowed School
Commissioners to determine into which category an endowment belonged. They usually favored the
secondary level over elementary institutions and restored endowments to the grammar school level, an act
which outraged local residents who favored the latter. Id. at 256. Under the Education Act of 1870, it
became the statutory responsibility of the parishes to provide for elementary education. 33 & 34 Vict., c.
75. School board expenses were to be raised from school fees voted by Parliament, money raised by
loan, or received from other sources. Any deficiency was to be raised from the rates. Id. §§ 53-56. For
the Commissioners the statute reaffirmed their tilt toward secondary education. For local authorities the
existing endowments were looked upon as a method of tax relief.
224. OWEN, supra note 5, at 256. A grammar school is a secondary school equivalent to an Ameri-
can high school in which at that time Latin and Greek were taught.
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three years, but because of Conservative opposition, had to accept only a one
year extension. Then, the Conservatives under Disraeli took office. The new
government introduced an Endowed Schools Act in 1873225 which replaced
the Endowed Schools Commission with the Charity Commission, 226 whom it
was thought would be less proactive.227 The Charity Commissioners were
able to exercise all of the powers under the Endowed Schools Act on their
own motion. 228 At last, after so many years the Charity Commission had
sufficient powers to reorganize decayed educational trusts. It was to prove a
pyrrhic victory. The criticism heaped on the Endowed School Commission-
ers was eventually transferred to the Charity Commission, but that lay a dec-
ade ahead.
For the first few years, the Charity Commission pursued its work with-
out controversy. The Commissioners seemed to pull their punches, focusing
on charitable trusts where there was no objection to reform. The bundling of
educational and legal issues proved efficient. In the first decade of their ex-
panded authority, the Commission framed five hundred schemes, none of
which were rejected by Parliament. There was still nagging criticism of their
work, but it was not until the changed economic and political climate of the
1880s that the Charity Commission became a widespread target of criticism.
L. A Changing Landscape: The 1880s
The 1880s were a time of political, economic, and social crisis and of
enormous change. In 1906, a sometime journalist and biographer wrote of
the period:
It was the end of an epoch. The long dominion of the middle classes
which had begun in 1832, had come to its close and with it the almost
equal reign of Liberalism. The great victories had been won. All sorts of
lumbering tyrannies had been toppled over. Authority was everywhere
broken. Slaves were free. Conscience was free. Trade was free. But hun-
ger and squalor and cold were also free; and the people demanded some-
thing more than liberty. 229
For much of the decade, England was in a depression. There was an
erosion of international economic dominance and increasing consolidation
and monopolization within industry. Poverty was seen as permanent, and a
225. An Act to Amend the Endowed Schools Acts, 37 & 38 Vict., c. 87 (1874) (Eng.).
226. id. § I.
227. OWEN, supra note 5, at 260.
228. 37 & 38 Viet., c. 87, § 4. These expanded powers only concerned educational endowments,
and when such assets had been reorganized, the Commission's powers would remain what they were
before assuming the mantle of the Endowed Schools Commission.
229. 1 WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL, LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL 268-69 (1906).
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working class with political and economic demands of its own emerged.
The middle and upper classes were determined to keep their privileges but
became more aware of the plight of the poor. Social justice emerged as a
concern, and the reigning ideologies of liberalism and laissez-faire gave
way to the modem concept of the welfare state. 230 In the midst of these
eddies crewed the Charity Commission, against the current of the times.
The ideology of philanthropy and the role of private charity also
changed. In midcentury, as in the past, the main responsibility for social
welfare lay with voluntary agencies. The state's efforts were complemen-
tary, to fill urgent gaps and relieve the destitute. During the 1880s, this
belief was called into question. The principal source of assistance would
now fall on the state to alleviate burdens that were far more serious, expen-
sive, and permanent than previously imagined.231 These larger contours of
society had an impact on the work, reputation, and effectiveness of the
Charity Commission.
M. Local Control of Charitable Endowments
The British public's response to issues of social justice was related to
the movement for political democracy, which had triumphed in the bor-
oughs in 1832 and 1867 and was extended to the counties in 1884 and
1885.232 Reform of local government accompanied the parliamentary re-
form of 1832. In 1830, there were 250 municipal corporations in England
and Wales, varying in size, constitution, probity, and democratic propen-
230. LYND, supra note 187, at 17, 28, 44, 156.
231. OWEN, supra note 5, at 211-12. Over thirty percent of people in London lived in the state of
poverty. 2 CHARLES BOOTH, LIFE AND LABOUR OF THE PEOPLE IN LONDON 21 (AMS Press 1970)
(1892). This poverty was found to be a permanent by-product of capitalism.
232. OWEN, supra note 5, at 262. The Reform Acts were a series of statutes that brought full de-
mocracy to England. An Act to Settle and Describe the Divisions of Counties, and the Limits of Cities
and Boroughs, in England and Wales, in so far as Respects the Election of Members to Serve in Parlia-
ment (The Act of 1832), 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 64. (Eng.), introduced the franchise in parliamentary elections
to £10 householders, that is to occupants of buildings that had £10 in annual rental value, and to ten-
ants-at-will in the counties who owned leaseholds to the value of £250 per year. For the first time, cities
such as Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, and Sheffield received representation in Parliament, as did
other towns. MICHAEL BENTLEY, POLITICS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY 1815-1914, at 54 (2d ed. 1996).
The middle classes were the beneficiaries of the 1832 statute. Id. An Act Further to Amend the Laws
Relating to the Representation of the People in England and Wales (The Representation of the People
Act, 1867), 30 & 31 Vict., e. 102 (Eng.), extended the franchise to working-class urban electors on the
basis of household suffrage, that is anyone who paid tax rates on their dwelling was entitled to vote. In
the counties the occupation franchise was lowered to a £ 12 limit. This meant all who resided in a prop-
erty with an annual rental value of at least £12 could vote. Lodgers, subject to a property qualification
of £10, also could vote. BENTLEY, supra, at 133-35. An Act to Amend the Law Relating to the Repre-
sentation of the People of the United Kingdom (The Representation of the People Act, 1884), 48 & 49
Viet., e. 3 (Eng.), expanded the franchise to a majority of adult males, particularly agricultural workers.
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sity. 2 33 For much of the nineteenth century, the only nationwide scheme of
local authorities was that of the boards of guardians administering the 1834
Poor Law.234 For the rest, counties were still ruled by unelected justices of
the peace; in the urban areas responsibility for basic services devolved on
the municip~al corporations, local improvement commissions, local boards,
a London vestry, or some combination of the above. 235 Other ad hoc bod-
ies, such as school boards were established under the 1870 education act.
236
At the central government level there was little coordination between the
agencies dealing with the poor (Poor Law Board) and those responsible for
public health (Medical Department of the Privy Council).
After the 1832 parliamentary reform, municipal bodies' corruption
could be no longer justified. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 af-
fected 178 boroughs with a total population of 2,000,000 and created stan-
dardized governance structures with councils, mayors, aldermen, and
councilors elected by ratepayers.23 7 These local governments had little
authority of their own, and a gaggle of separate bodies dealt with such
things as sanitation and urban renewal.
238
The parish remained the unit of rate assessment but no longer contin-
ued as a unit of local government. Parishes meant different things in differ-
ent contexts. 239 The Local Government Act of 1888240 created elected
county councils and removed power from justices of the peace and city
233. WOODWARD, supra note 2, at 459-60. In rural areas was a county and parish system of
nonelected justices of the peace.
234. An Act for the Amendment and Better Administration of the Laws Relating to the Poor in
England and Wales, 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76 (1834) (Eng.). The Poor Law took the form of putting an end to
the almost absolute control over the poor exercised by the justices, overseers, and boards of guardians
and gave control to a body of Poor Law Commissioners. The commissions were dissolved in 1847 and
a Poor Law Board substituted. Their powers were transferred in 1871 to a Local Government Board. An
Act for Constituting a Local Government Board and Vesting Therein Certain Functions of the Secretary
of State and Privy Council Concerning the Public Health and Local Government, Together with the
Powers and Duties of the Poor Law Board (Local Government Board Act, 1871), 34 & 35 Vict., c. 70,
§ 2 (Eng).
235. R.C.K. ENSOR, ENGLAND 1870-1914, at 125 (1936).
236. Education Act of 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 75 (Eng.).
237. An Act to Provide for the Regulation of Municipal Corporations in England and Wales (Mu-
nicipal Corporations Act, 1835), 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76 (Eng.). The Act is described in 14 HOLDSWORTi-,
supra note 188, at 235-37.
238. Birmingham, under the leadership of Joseph Chamberlain, led the way in local planning and
municipal ownership. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1882, which enabled local authorities to issue
stock, gave them enormous economic power. LYND, supra note 187, at 167-68 (citing An Act for
Consolidating, with Amendments, Enactments Relating to Municipal Corporations in England and
Wales (The Municipal Corporations Act, 1882), 45 & 46 Vict., c. 50 (Eng.)). Local municipalities
began to attack local problems.
239. 14 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 188, at 206-07.
240. An Act to Amend the Laws Relating to Local Government in England and Wales, and for
Other Purposes Connected Therewith (Local Govemment Act, 1888), 51 & 52 Vict., c. 41 (Eng.).
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council functions from the boroughs. 24 1 The Local Government Act of
1894, generally known as the Parish Councils Bill, 242 detached the civil
parish from the ecclesiastical parish. The former was instituted as the hum-
blest unit in a new scheme of local government. 243 Nearly 7,000 parish or
district councils were established with widespread power but little ability to
raise financial resources. 244 However, they were representative bodies un-
der the County Councils. The progress of democratic ideas in the sphere of
local government was now reflected in the creation of representative bodies
at different levels of government. The emergence of local political initia-
tives and locally elected authorities was soon followed by demands for the
community's voice in the management of charitable endowments.
The Charity Commission responded to these developments. Local
control meant, in practice, more eyes examining endowments. Public scru-
tiny could serve to protect against misfeasance. The Commission then
broadened trustee participation by conferring with local representative bod-
ies and agencies-town councils, vestries, boards of guardians. 245 After the
passage of the Local Government Act of 1888 and the Parish Councils Bill
in 1894, there were local bodies who could appoint trustees and, more im-
portantly, could stand between often hostile trustees and the Commission.
This created problems in and of itself as local bodies tried to create empires
and control appointments as spoils.
246
The County Councils created a substantial amount of new business for
the Commission, because they sought information on charities in their ju-
risdiction and requested the Commission to undertake a Brougham-type
survey in their county. The Commission lacked the resources for such an
effort, but with the passage of the Charity Inquiries (Expenses) Act of
1892,247 if a county desired a survey, a county could contribute toward the
expenses of any inquiries for trusts in their county. Several counties in
241. Sixty-two county councils were created in England and Wales. Sixty-one towns over 50,000
inhabitants were given county borough status. London was given its own County Council. ENSOR,
supra note 235, at 203.
242. An Act to Make Further Provision for Local Government in England and Wales, 56 & 57
Vict., c. 73 (1894) (Eng.).
243. 14 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 188, at 207.
244. ENSOR, supra note 235, at 214. - •
245. OWEN, supra note 5, at 316 (citing Report from the Select Committee on Charity Commission,
together with the Proceedings of the Committee app. no. 10, at 340 (1894)).
246. The local bodies appointed political supporters, whereas the Commission's choice would be
based on merit.
247. An Act to Authorise the Councils of Counties and County Boroughs to Contribute to the
Expenses of Inquiries into Certain Charities (Charities Inquiries (Expenses) Act, 1892), 55 & 56 Vict.,
c. 15 (Eng.).
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England and Wales were surveyed, but the effort ended with the outbreak
of war in 1914.248
N. Public Relations Problems and Political Ineptitude
The awakening of working class consciousness in the 1880s revived
the criticism of the Commissioners' labors under the Endowed Schools
Acts. Their actions in ending free education in the grammar schools and
substituting places on the basis of merit resulted in a bias against the poor
and a favoring of the middle classes. Though the Charity Commissioners
primarily focused on the grammar schools, their policies also affected en-
dowed elementary schools. 249 In the politically charged atmosphere of the
decade, this led to substantial criticism of the Charity Commissioners. 250 A
Select Committee on Endowed Schools during 1886-1887 provided a fo-
rum for critics to vent their grievances. The Commissioners refused to ac-
cept the conclusions of their critics. They claimed they were following the
charge of the Endowed School Commission and the resulting statute, but
that was a political generation ago. 251
The Commissioners were politically inept and became a foil for critics
of educational reform, an issue that affected all parties, religions, locations,
and classes. They angered Parliament with their legalistic approach and
literal interpretation of the Endowed Schools legislation. The Commission-
ers were accused of being too Tory for the Radicals and too Radical for the
Tories.252 However, the criticisms were not solely political in nature.
Members of the working classes were outraged that they lost their limited
right to free education. Many boroughs were angered that the Commission
prevented the use of educational endowments to reduce parish rates. The
Commissioners did not educate the public of their tasks or inform them of
248. OWEN, supra note 5, at 318.
249. Many smaller endowments, over 100 in the first sixteen years, were continued. Most times,
but not always, they faced no opposition. Select Committee on Endowed Schools Act, app 7, at 488-94
(1886).
250. The Charity Commission was investigated by Parliament in 1884, 1886, and 1887. The Select
Committee on the Charitable Trusts Acts stated in its report that such dissatisfaction as existed with the
action of the Charity Commission seemed to have arisen mainly in carrying out the policy of the En-
dowed Schools Act especially with respect to the Commission's declining to appropriate funds to the
direct support of elementary schools, and to maintain or institute a system of free education. LEONARD
SYER BRISTOWE & WALTER IVIMEY COOK, TUDOR'S CHARITABLE TRUSTS 457 (3d ed. 1889). Parlia-
ment raised these criticisms as well. See TIMES (London), May 23, 1884, at 7c; TIMES (London), Aug.
14, 1890, at 5c.
251. OWEN, supra note 5, at 264-65. The cause of the lower classes was taken up by major politi-
cians, such as James Bryce, which added to the Commission's problems.
252. TIMES (London), Apr. 24, 1895, at 7c.
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their accomplishments. 253 They antagonized their natural allies, trustees,
who felt the Commissioners were interfering even when trustees were do-
ing their job.254 Local bodies and representatives thought they knew the
best method of reform and reorganization for their charitable trusts.
The Commission was criticized with some justification for its compli-
cated procedures, an arrogant and legalistic attitude, and as a wholly un-
popular body lacking political support. In a period of emerging local
devolution, the Commission was seen as a central agency imposing its will
without regard for local sensibilities. The Commission could not get par-
liamentary support to defend its policies, in part because of an anomalous
constitutional position. The Commission functioned under no minister of
government. As an independent agency, and one that had generated contro-
versy from a variety of sources, the Commission could rely on few in Par-
liament or the government. Its lack of political support made it difficult to
carry out its work.2
55
The constitutional position of the Charity Commission was investi-
gated during the 1884-1887 investigations and in 1894 by a Select Com-
mittee. In 1895, it was unsuccessfully moved that it become reconstituted
as a government department. 256 In each of the investigations by Select
Committees of Parliament, the Committees generally supported the Com-
mission and its desire for additional powers. However, the Commission
253. OWEN, supra note 5, at 316; TIMES (London), May 23, 1884; TIMES (London), June 8, 1894,
at 14e; TIMES (London), Aug. 14, 1890, at 5a.
254. The relationship of the Charity Commissioners to charity trustees was described by Lord
Lyndhurst. The Commissioners were "public officers invested with public powers and public duties."
85 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1846) 155. Only where trustees overlooked a trust's interests, or deviated from
the terms of their trust, did any real antagonism exist between the two authorities. Trustees are the sole
and responsible administrators of the income of the charity within the limits prescribed by the founder.
They have no power to deal with capital or vary the prescribed mode of applications. Commissioners do
not administer, but they are constituted the judges of all dealings with capital, as well as of all varieties
of prescribed mode of giving effort to the objects of charity. Id.
255. See TIMES (London), Apr. 24, 1895, at 7c. For its link with Parliament, an unpaid Fourth
Commissioner, who was a member of the House of Commons, was the official liaison. The government
of the day designated one of its members as the Fourth Commissioner. Given the responsibilities of
govemment ministers, it should not surprise that the Fourth Commissioner was noted only by his
absence of any participation with the Charity Commission. From 1887 the Fourth Commissioner was to
be a member of the House without a government portfolio. This may have been a mere sensible ar-
rangement, but it did not resolve the constitutional issue nor the public relations problems. The issue
was unresolved until 1960 when the Charity Commission came under the portfolio of the Home Secre-
tary, where it remains today.
256. The advantages of governmental control, depending on one's view of the Commission, were
that Parliament would better control it, particularly its expenses which were seen as too large. As a
ministry of the state it would be more responsive to local political bodies, more representative, less
unpopular, and more accountable. Additionally, it would be more likely to attain the additional powers
it sought. The arguments against were that the Commission would become politicized and its quasi-
judicial role was inappropriate for a government agency. See TIMES (London), Apr. 24, 1895, at 7c.
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was never able to persuade Parliament to grant the powers received under
the Endowed Schools or Parochial Charities legislation.
There were three powers the Commission lacked that would have en-
abled it to reorganize the most egregiously run trusts: (1) the ability to
eliminate or raise the fifty pound annual income limitation on charities so
that the Commission could proactively investigate, (2) an audit function,
and (3) the power to unilaterally reform trusts.
1. The Fifty Pound Limitation
The £50 annual income limitation on charities that the Commission
could investigate on its own initiative was never raised, so they could not
take the initiative to reform larger charities. This meant that larger charities
in need of restructuring could not be touched, absent trustee invitation,
which in the most egregious situations would not be forthcoming. An ex-
ample was Brown's Hospital at Stamford, a charity with £1200 annual
income and twelve almsmen. The warder was paid £375 and a confrater
£200. An agricultural depression reduced the annual income, so that the
almsmen could not be maintained by the trustees. Nevertheless, they ap-
pointed a new confrater at the regular stipend.257 The income limitation
also hindered the Commission's efforts to consolidate several charities to
make the philanthropic effort more efficient or timely. Larger charities
typically would refuse to cooperate. This often occurred with dole charities
that often were of modest size with separate trustees. The clever poor
would make the rounds of endowments, collecting from several charities.
Despite such abuses, the unpopularity of the Commission was such that it
could not obtain a lifting of the £50 limit. Critics felt it would give too
much power over charitable endowments and would allow it to override
local control.
2. The Audit Function
A second power, the audit function, the heart of modem administra-
tive and regulatory scrutiny, was first recommended in the report of a Se-
lect Committee in 1835 as a necessary supplement to the Charity
Commission's power to require accounts from charities' trustees.2 58 This
power, never granted to the Commission, meant there was no way short of
an action of equity to examine the books of a charitable trust that would
257. 344 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1890) 355, 371.
258. MITCHESON, supra note 10, at 20.
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have enabled the Charity Commission to publicize misdealing, which may
have led to a quicker resolution of a problem.
3. Cy Pres and the Extent of the Commissioners' Power to Reform Trusts
The law has always favored charitable trusts. Unlike private trusts,
charitable trusts may exist in perpetuity. The courts can use their equitable
powers to prevent a trust from failure or to reform it so as to accomplish its
general purposes by applying the doctrine of cy pres. 259 Thus, cy pres is a
savings device that permits a court to keep assets in the charitable stream to
benefit the public. Cy pres permits a court to direct a charitable purpose
different from the specific one of the donor, but this right of modification is
strictly construed and closely circumscribed. The modification must be as
near as possible to the donor's original purpose. The degree of frustration
of the original purpose must be great; the donor must have at least implic-
itly consented to the change in the original trust instrument; and the degree
of change must be relatively small. 260 The primary duty of a court is to give
effect to the donor's intentions. The Charity Commission never had a gen-
eral power to change the purposes of a charitable trust. It was bound by the
limits of the cy pres doctrine, as interpreted by Chancery, in its reorganiz-
ing schemes, because it had concurrent jurisdiction with Chancery. The
Endowed Schools and Parochial Charities Acts gave the Commission au-
thority to exceed the parameters of the cy pres doctrine, but this only ap-
plied to those specific types of endowments. This created particular
problems when dealing with charities in areas other than education where
the original uses might be fanciful or outmoded, but the Commission was
limited in the modifications it could order.
Perhaps the most significant factor relating to the use of the cy pres
doctrine is how will a court interpret whether circumstances are inexpedient
or impracticable? If cy pres is interpreted liberally, then charitable trusts
can be reformed or consolidated more easily. Generally, courts have ap-
plied the doctrine very conservatively. Recall the Leeds School Case
261
where Lord Chancellor Eldon interpreted the doctrine so strictly that it was
difficult to reform charitable trusts at all. A problem of cy pres is that it is
governed by an ambiguous standard. When is a trust's purpose inexpedi-
ent? Depending upon how one answers determines the use of the doctrine
259. For a definition of cypres, see supra note 52. Cypres applies to the modification of the trust's
purposes, A related concept of deviation applies to a trust's administration, but the distinction may be
difficult to draw.
260, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959).
261. OWEN, supra note 5, at 248-49.
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as a tool to reform charitable trusts. For the Charity Commission, Chan-
cery's position on the use of cy pres and the standard to be applied were
critical. The Commission's orders were subject to appeal, and if it exceeded
Chancery's application of the doctrine, it might be overturned. A restrictive
cy pres doctrine had a chilling effect on the actions of the Charity
Commission.
262
Around the third quarter of the century, the courts began applying cy
pres in a more flexible manner, which allowed the Commissioners to reor-
ganize and consolidate charitable trusts to carry out their founders' inten-
tions more efficiently.263 This expansive approach continued in the
important decision of Campden Charities.264 Viscountess Campden created
a trust in the seventeenth century that contained land sufficient to yield £10
annually, half for the poor and needy and the other half for apprenticeship
fees for boys from Kensington, a small village about one and a half miles
from Hyde Park Comer. By the latter nineteenth century, the village had
become a thickly inhabited, affluent suburb of London. The property had
become extraordinarily valuable, and the trust found itself with an annual
income of £2200. The trustees applied to the Charity Commissioners for a
scheme. The Commissioners devised a plan whereby the income would be
used for existing purposes but also included sums for educational purposes
as a cy pres application of some of the apprenticeship income. The resi-
dents of Kensington objected to admitting education as one of the trust's
purposes. The Vice Chancellor agreed, but the case was overturned on
appeal by Sir George Jessel, Master of the Rolls, applying the cy pres doc-
trine. 265 The court looked at the principal object of the trust, which was to
262. There was the possibility of a parliamentary bill to affirm a scheme that was inappropriate for
cypres treatment or beyond the scope of the doctrine, but it was a useless tool as the Commission could
not obtain parliamentary approval.
263. In Clephane v. Lord Provost of Edinburgh, the House of Lords applied the deviation doctrine
to distinguish between the charity itself and the mode prescribed for its accomplishment. In this case an
almshouse was demolished when a railway's route ran through it. The railroad gave £10,000 compensa-
tion. The House of Lords concluded that the funds could be better spent on pensions and other forms of
outdoor relief:
[While] one charity will not be substituted for another charity; nor will a charity intended for
one purpose be applied to a purpose altogether different; but in the progress of society a
change of mode may become desirable, and the Courts have sanctioned such change of mode
to secure more effectually the benefits intended,
I L.R.-Sc. & Div. 417 HL (1869) (Lord Westbury).
264. In re Campden Charities, 18 Ch. D. 310 (C.A. 1881).
265. The rationale behind the use of the doctrine was as follows: at the time of her gift, apprentice-
ship was compulsory under the Statute of Artificers. An Act Containing Divers Orders for Artificers,
Labourers, Servants of Husbandry and Apprentices, 5 Eliz. 1, c. 4, § 33 (1563) (Eng.). No one could
enter a trade unless he had been apprenticed for seven years. Id. Viscountess Campden's gift enabled
the poor of the parish to enter trades specified in the statute. The legislation was later repealed, and
apprenticeships were becoming obsolete. See An Act to Amend an Act, passed in the Fifth Year of
Queen Elizabeth, Entitled An Act Containing Divers Orders for Artificers, Labourers, Servants of
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provide for the poor. To use it according to the original purpose would
defeat the spirit of the donor's gift, which was to assist in part the poor in
obtaining work, something that education, rather than apprenticeships,
could accomplish. The Commissioners' diversion to educational purposes
was appropriate. The Campden Charities case was a high water mark in the
direction of diverting charities from purposes unsuitable to the times and
was welcomed by the Commission, because it offered greater flexibility
and lessened the possibility of a court challenge to their schemes.
266
Professor Owen doubted that even if the Commission had received
general powers to reform trusts more expansive than the cy pres doctrine
that they would have undertaken a wholesale revision of charitable en-
dowments. 267 The Commission lacked the resources to undertake such a
task. The number of new charities formed each year strained its capacity.
Additionally, opposition would arise if the Commission, hardly a popular
body, attempted to use its powers for a broad revamping. Then, as now, the
belief of adhering to "founders' wishes" resonated strongly.268 Even if the
Commissioners exercised cy pres powers broadly, their decisions could be
appealed to Chancery.
CONCLUSIONS
The work of the Charity Commission in the nineteenth century may be
summed up as frustration and disappointment combined with substantial
achievements. The body never was granted sufficient authority or resources
to rationalize all charitable endowments in need of reform. Nor could it
ever garner public or parliamentary support. The Commission's efforts
were resisted by trustees of charities. It became a symbol of meddling gov-
ernment. By the end of the century, the office seemed to lose vigor and
initiative, demonstrated when it attempted to carry out the Endowed
Schools and Parochial Charities acts,269 and was viewed as a government
bureaucracy doing routine things in a routine way.
Husbandry, and Apprentices, 54 Geo. 3, c. 96 (1814) (Eng.). Not all the apprenticeship funds were
diverted, but the trustees were not required to devote all the charity's resources to the obsolescent
purpose.
266. In 1910, the cy pres tide shifted in the other direction in the Weir Hospital Case, 2 Ch. 124
(C.A. 1910) and the Commissioners had to trim their sails in response. In this case the Commissioners
approved a scheme whereby the funds of two inadequately endowed medical charities in adjoining
London boroughs could be administered together for joint objects. The Court of Appeal held the Com-
missioners had exceeded their powers.
267. OWEN, supra note 5, at 311.
268. See In re Estate of Beryl H. Buck, No. 23259 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986), reprinted in John G.
Simon, American Philanthropy and the Buck Trust, 21 U.S.F.L. REV. 641, 691 (1987).
269. OWEN, supra note 5, at 213, 329.
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The Nathan Report summarized the problems of the Charities Com-
mission that remained for a century until the 1960 revision: the need for a
relaxation of cy pres; a chronic shortage of staff, which was exacerbated
over the decades as the number of trusts increased; an increasing need for
the revision of thousands of trusts; the lack of amending legislation; the
declining effort by the Commissioners to foster change; and the lack of any
parliamentary champion of their cause. 270 The work of the Commission did
not fall within the province of any minister. Because of the pressures on
parliamentary time, this meant Charity Commission issues were ignored.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Commission, sensing a lack of
public interest in its work, stopped renewing pressures for change.
2 71
Nevertheless, the Commission had achieved much in reforming the
charities of the City of London and rationalizing educational endow-
ments. 272 It raised the profile of fiduciaries who misused charitable assets.
Charities' activities were more public, and the devolution of authority to
local agencies created a new community interest in charitable endowments.
One of its most important accomplishments was the rationalization of the
investment and management of charity funds.
2 7 3
Requiring the submission of annual accounts and the consent of the
Commissioners for trustees to engage in self-dealing created more trans-
parency of charitable assets. The Nathan Report concluded that dishonest
administration of charitable trusts was nonexistent and many were saved
from trustee nonfeasance.
274
The reform of educational trusts, where much good work was accom-
plished, was a political albatross shed at the end of the century. 275 The
Charity Commissioners had exercised their responsibilities to reform edu-
270. NATHAN REPORT, supra note 94, 101-10, at 26-28, 1 375, at 96.
271. Id. 107,at28.
272. By the end of the 1880s, 4,000 educational schemes had been framed, mostly involving
smaller charities. During the 1870s it was issuing about 400 orders annually for appointing trustees or
establishing schools. OWEN, supra note 5, at 304.
273. In the first twenty-five years it managed £8 million. TWENTY-FIFTH REPORT OF THE CHARITY
COMMISSIONERS FOR ENGLAND AND WALES A2 (1877).
274. NATHAN REPORT, supra note 94, 101, at 26.
275. In 1899, the Commission's educational responsibilities were shifted to a national board of
education, An Act to Provide for the Establishment of a Board of Education for England and Wales, and
for Matters Connected Therewith (Board of Education Act, 1899), 62 & 63 Vict., c. 33, § 2(2) (Eng),
which henceforth would frame and establish schemes for educational endowments in England and
Wales. Responsibility for management of educational endowments was also transferred. OWEN, supra
note 5, at 270-73. The Education Act of 1902, established a system of secondary education and made
the County and County Borough Councils acting through their Educational Committees, the local
educational authority for all classes of school. An Act to Make Further Provision with Respect to
Education in England and Wales (Education Act, 1902), 2 Edw. 7, c. 42 (Eng.). They took the place of
the county governing bodies. ARCHER, supra note 186, at 300. This statute symbolized the assumption
by the state of an overall educational policy.
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cational trusts effectively but with perhaps too legalistic a focus. Their
qualifications were as lawyers, not educators, a fact which they, and all too
often their critics, recognized.
Some, but not all, of the Commission's problems were not of its own
doing. The Charity Commission had enormous responsibilities but inade-
quate resources, a common plaint of governmental agencies. Its scope un-
der the enabling legislation and its successors were uncertain. The inability
to issue binding regulations, a necessary power and function of administra-
tive agencies today, hindered the influence of its work. The schemes it
developed for a particular charity were ad hoc, whereas a regulation usually
is binding on all under an agency's jurisdiction, or at least provides guid-
ance. The Commission never received the powers or resources it thought it
needed. The various Select Committees that examined its work agreed with
this, but additional resources were not forthcoming, even though the Com-
mission's workload increased. Though Parliament regularly criticized its
budget and staffing, the growth of the charitable sector far outpaced new
resources. 276 As its workload increased, the staff did not, which resulted in
delays in responding to inquiries that reinforced a reputation for ineffi-
ciency and unresponsiveness. Charities refused to comply with the Com-
mission's demand that they file their accounts.
The Charity Commission never achieved its expectations because they
were unrealistic. Fundamentally, the purpose of the Commission was to
take assets from unused or neglected charities and to transfer them to
needed modem uses: education and poor relief. The ideological grounding
of the Commission's belief that private resources were available to meet
society's ills proved wrong. At most, private philanthropy was a comple-
ment, and a decreasing one, to the state's responsibility for improving pub-
lic welfare. The failure of the Charity Commission in some sense reflected
the failure of nineteenth-century liberalism and its replacement by the
modem welfare state.
In the second and third decades of the nineteenth century, the
Brougham Commission conclusively demonstrated that some permanent
vehicle for the supervision of charities was needed to assure the proper
disposition of charitable assets. Nevertheless, it took twenty years before
such a body was created, and the resulting commission lacked necessary
powers. It was weak, ineffective, and subject to criticism. Most govern-
mental agencies fall short of the aspirations of their original proponents, yet
they escape the criticism and abuse visited upon the Charity Commission.
276. This is a situation that exists today for the United States Revenue Service.
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Why is it so difficult to carry out effective institutional change? Why did
the principle of charitable accountability, a nearly unanimously supported
norm in the abstract, ring so hollow in practice?
The Charity Commission had two very different functions: one was to
combat fraud. The second role was educational: to bring a sense of order
and responsibility to the charitable sector. The Commission's lack of statu-
tory authority hindered its enforcement role. Its resources were consumed
by the second. The scope and the difficulty of the Commission's task were
not realized by Parliament, the press, or the public. As expectations went
unmet, criticism followed. Perhaps the Commission's fatal mistake was to
outrun its natural allies in Parliament as well as charitable trustees. The
Commission engaged in vigorous efforts at reform when allowed but never
built a reservoir of support over time. Its primary supporters might have
been beneficiaries of reformed trusts, but they were usually among the
more powerless in society.
The social class perceptions of an institution may affect its reputation
and influence. A factor in the Commission's lack of support in Parliament
was the perceived lack of ability of the Commissioners. This may have
been a code word for their middle class origins, a mark against them. The
Charity Commission later was taken to task for being anti-working class.
Many of the trustees of charitable trusts in need of reformation, particularly
those controlled by religious interests, were of a higher social standing and
could garner support or tolerance against change.
Finally, charitable accountability is not of central importance to gov-
ernment or politics and is marginal to the overall health of society. Because
of its relative unimportance to economic well-being compared to monetary
or fiscal policy, foreign affairs, or national defense, politicians were reluc-
tant to use political capital to support the Commission. The Commission
itself did not attempt to nurture political capital and, particularly in its ef-
forts to reform educational trusts, seemed to have no sense as to which way
the political winds were blowing. It adopted a highly legalistic approach,
based completely on its original charge from the Endowed Schools Act. It
could not and seemed not to try to placate anyone. Its response to criticism
seemed to cause the body to turn inward, to bury itself in the legalistic as-
pects of its charge. Its accomplishments were not recognized. It was to take
nearly another century, and several other reports and select committees for
the Charity Commission, to become closer to the ideal of an effective
guardian of charitable accountability. Many of the problems the Charity
Commission faced: lack of resources, inadequate legislative support, too
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broad a mandate with too many organizations to oversee, face American
regulators today.
